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Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred by Article I, 
Section 12, Utah Constitution, Section 77-1-6 and 77-35-26, 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended) and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction of vio-
lations of Section 76-8-508, Tampering With a Witness, a third 
degree felony, and 76-8-201, Official Misconduct, a Class B 
misdemeanor, which was entered in the Third District Court 
following jury trial before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno. The 
third degree felony was reduced to a class A misdemeanor at the 
time of sentencing. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant 
various pre-trial motions with respect to discoverv. 
2. Whether the grand jury testimony of Tolman should 
have been suppressed as substantive evidence. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in ruling upon 
admissibility of evidence. 
4. Whether the jury verdict was unduly influenced by 
prosecutor misconduct or outside sources. 
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Section 76-8-508, Tampering with witness - Retaliation against 
witness or informant - Bribery. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or other-
wise cause a person to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, 
document, or thing; or 
(c) Elude legal process summoning him to 
provide evidence; or 
(d) Absent himself from any proceeding or 
investigation to which he has been summoned; 
or 
(2) He commits any unlawful act in retal-
iation for anything done by another in his 
capacity as a witness or informant; or 
(3) He solicits, accepts or agrees to accept 
any benefit in consideration of his doing any 
of the things specified in paragraph (1). 
Section 76-8-201, Official misconduct - Unauthorized acts or 
failure of duty, 
A public servant is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit 
himself or another or to harm another, he 
knowingly commits an unauthorized act which 
purports to be an act of his office, or 
knowingly refrains from performing a duty 
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in 
the nature of his office. 
Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence, Preliminary Questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. 
Preliminary questions concerning the quali-
fication of a person to be a witness, the 
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existence of a privilege, or the admissibil-
ity of evidence shall be determined by the 
court, subject to the provisions of subdivi-
sion (b). In making its determination it is 
not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. 
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon 
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition, 
(c) Hearing of jury. 
Hearings on the admissibility of confessions 
shall in all cases be conducted out of the 
hearing of the jury. Hearings on other 
preliminary matters shall be so conducted 
when the interests of justice require or, 
when an accused is a witness, if he so 
requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. 
The accused does not, by testifying upon a 
preliminary matter, subject himself to 
cross-examination as to other issues in the 
case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. 
This rule does not limit the right of a party 
to introduce before the jury evidence rele-
vant to weight or credibility. 
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything 
upon his or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing him to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in connection 
therewith, except that a juror may testify on 
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the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the 
jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by him concerning a matter 
about which he would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence, Definitions. 
(a) Statement. 
A "statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by him as an 
assertion. 
(b) Declarant. 
A "declarant" is a person who makes a state-
ment. 
(c) Hearsay. 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. 
A statement is not hearsay if 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with his testimony or the 
witness denies having made the statement or 
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express 
or implied charge against him of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made 
after perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) his own statement, in either his indi-
vidual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
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statement of which he has manifested his 
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by him to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or 
(D) a statement by his agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of his 
agency or employment, made during the 
existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a co-conspirator of a party 
during the course and in the furtherance of 
the conspiracy. 
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
When facts not set out in an information or 
indictment are required to inform a defendant 
of the nature and cause of the offense 
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his 
defense, the defendant may file a written 
motion for a bill of particulars. The motion 
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
days thereafter, or at such later time as the 
court may permit. The court may, on its own 
motion, direct the filing of a bill of 
particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject 
to such conditions as justice may require. 
The request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement 
of factual information needed to set forth 
the essential elements of the particular 
offense charged. 
Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
If a defendant is charged with a felony, he 
shall not be called on to plead befoire the 
committing magistrate. During the initial 
appearance before the magistrate, the defen-
dant shall be advised of his right to a 
preliminary examination. If the defendant 
waives his right to a preliminary ex-
amination, and the prosecuting attorney 
consents, the magistrate shall forthwith 
order the defendant bound over to answer in 
the district court. If the defendant does 
not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary 
examination. Such examination shall be held 
within a reasonable time, but in any event 
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not later than ten days if the defendant is 
in custody for the offense charged and not 
later than 30 days if he is not in custody; 
provided, however, that these time periods 
may be extended by the magistrate for good 
cause shown. A preliminary examination shall 
not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instruct-
ed, stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure - Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is 
other good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless 
a judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment until the defendant is 
charged anew or retried, or may enter any 
other order as may be just and proper under 
the circumstances. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure - Motion for new trial, 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice if there is any error 
or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
in writing and upon notice. The motion shall 
be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of 
the essential facts in support of the motion. 
If additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
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the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
within 10 days after imposition of sentence, 
or within such further time as the court may 
fix during the ten day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party 
shall be in the same position as if no trial 
had been held and the former verdict shall 
not be used or mentioned either in evidence 
or in argument. 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution, [Rights of accused 
person. ] . 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have 
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaran-
teed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitution, [Prosecution by infor-
mation or indictment - Grand jury.1. 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by infor-
mation after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused with the consent of the State, 
or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legis-
lature. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Tolman agrees in substance with the Statement of the 
Case submitted by Harman and adopts its contents. He also 
provides the following supplement to procedural aspects of the 
case. 
Tolman was indicted on October 9. (R. 2-10.) He made 
oral motion to quash Count I on October 24, which was reserved by 
Presiding Judge Daniels. Tolman's arraignment was set over to 
November 7, for hearing on a motion for preliminary examination. 
(R. 12.) The motion for preliminary hearing was denied on 
November 7. (R. 55, 57-58.) Subsequent motions for Discovery, 
Bill of Particulars and Motion to Quash Count I were filed, as 
well as a Motion to Establish Preliminary Question In Re Conspir-
acy. (R. 59-69.) Memoranda were also filed supporting these 
motions. (R. 82-99.) All these motions were ultimately and 
summarily denied by the court. (R. 159,160.) However, no 
pre-trial hearing or order was ever entered regarding the prelim-
inary question of conspiracy. 
Meanwhile, Harman had filed a Motion to Compel Discov-
ery which was heard on January 23, which counsel for Tolman 
attended and joined. (R. 102.) The court subsequently ordered 
transcripts of all grand jury testimony pertaining to the Indict-
ment. (R. 118-119.) 
Following the production of grand jury transcripts 
ordered by the court (R. 118-119), Tolman determined that his 
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appearance before the grand jury diverged in form and substance 
from other subject witnesses. He filed a Motion to Quash or 
Alternatively Suppress Statements (R. 186-187) along with sup-
porting pleadings (R. 168-177), contending that he was improperly 
advised as to his "subject" status which had adversely affected 
his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. [These same pleadings also appear within 
the record at R. 188-205, along with a copy of State v. Ruggeri 
upon which Tolman supports his contention.] The motion was not 
heard until after commencement of trial. 
When the motion was heard, Lorin Brooks testified in 
supplement to the notes which had been attached as an exhibit to 
Plaintifffs Responsive Pleading. (R. 238-240; R. 537, T. 
1020-1028.) Counsel argued the motion and the court denied it. 
(R. 537, T. 1037.) Portions of Tolman's grand jury testimony 
were read and copies of the transcript marked as Exhibits 30, 31 
and 32. (R. 530, T. 33-56.) 
During the trial, the court was called upon to make an 
evidentiary ruling regarding the testimony of witness Christensen 
relating to conversations he had had with Tolman in August, 1983. 
(R. 531, T. 1195-1208.) A series of objections by the prose-
cution prompted the court to rule that Christensen could not 
testify as to what he (Christensen) had stated during those 
conversations. Hence, several of Christensen's relevant state-
ments and perceptions were never allowed to be presented. 
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Voluminous testimony was presented at trial that Tolman 
directed Dean Larsen to hide from Don Harman the fact that Larsen 
had a copy of Tolman's unapproved seven-page report (see footnote 
JW, infra). When the jury instructions were prepared for sub-
mission, Tolman provided the court with his proposed instruction 
on Count IV. (R. 447,) This instruction was rejected, and 
Tolman objected that the instruction given created "strict 
liability" and therefore was overly broad. (R. 532, T. 1428.) 
The court allowed the prosecutor's instruction to be given, and 
Tolman was ultimately convicted of Count IV. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
SECTION I - PRE-TRIAL ISSUES 
Tolman was denied adequate pre-trial discovery, despite 
several explicit requests, upon which to prepare his defense 
which ultimately created prejudice to him at trial. This preju-
dice was exacerbated by the court's failure to determine the 
preliminary question of conspiracy and Rule 104(a), U.R.E. 
regarding the admissibility of Defendants' statements under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E), U.R.E. Despite Tolman's clear demonstration to the 
court of the unique nature of this proceeding, the court failed 
to adequately safeguard Tolman's interest in a fair trial. 
SECTION II - TRIAL ISSUES 
The trial court erred in allowing transcripts of 
Tolman's grand jury testimony to be read into the record and 
presented as Exhibits. The court also failed to rule properly 
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that a witness (Mike Christensen) could testify as to what he 
said and did during conversations with Tolman which occurred in 
August, 1983. 
Section 76-8-508(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and 
overly broad, and the trial court erred in failing to give 
instructions requested by Tolman. 
SECTION III - PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT 
The misconduct of the prosecution denied Appellant 
Tolman the full panoply of rights, privileges and the due process 
of law beginning with him being the sole grand jury witness 
denied adequate notice of charges and access to counsel and 
continuing through the concealment from him of exculpatory 
evidence and attempts and preventing his presentment of probative 
evidence and culminating in the open court statements that 
Appellant could be called to testify on his own behalf. The 
court failed to sanction the prosecutorial misconduct by ordering 
a mistrial or dismissal. 
SECTION IV - POST TRIAL ISSUES 
The jury verdict was the product of improper outside 
influence and other improper consideration extraneous to the 
evidence which, after many hours of deliberation, changed the 
jury vote from 6-2 in favor of acquittal to an opposite result. 
The said jury submitted the ultimate issue to one juror who 
asserted his religious authority (Mormon priesthood) to seek 
divine intervention by prayer after which he expressed the 
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inspired or revealed knowledge from God of Appellant's guilt 
which caused the four other jurors to change their opinion at 
once and the remaining two to acquiesce to the inspired majority 
due to implied intimidation and an erroneous belief that they 
could not hang. 
The court not only erred by denying Appellant's motions 
for arrest of judgment/mistrial regarding these issues, the court 
compounded the error by allowing a dictionary in the jury room 
and by refusing to consider juror testimony on the question of 
outside influence. 
SECTION V - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
There is insufficient evidence of Tampering with a 
Witness and Official Misconduct to sustain a conviction of 
Tolman. 
ARGUMENT 
SECTION I - PRE-TRIAL ISSUES 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO QUASH 
COUNT I OF THE INDICTMENT WHICH CLEARLY DID NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY CHARGE THE CRIME OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 
Tolman submitted to the court a Memorandum which 
delineated the factual deficiencies of the Indictment regarding 
Count I, the crime of Criminal Conspiracy in violation of 
§76-4-201, Utah Code Annotated (as amended.) (R. 82-88, Addendum 
A-l.) The arguments contained therein are part of the record, 
and are summaried by stating that regardless of how that charge 
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is read in relationship to Tolman, there is never any basis to 
believe a unity of design, purpose, or will to establish an 
agreement with Harman. Secondly, none of the overt acts alleged 
could possibly have been in furtherance of any presumed agree-
ment, simply because they are not done in furtherance of the 
crime' of Tampering with Evidence, §76-8-501, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, (as amended). 
The paucity of Utah case law on grand jury proceedings 
buttresses the general notion that this case had a sufficiently 
unique nature to warrant meticulous treatment bv the trial court. 
This issue presents merely one instance where the trial court 
refused to acknowledge a procedural defect which may (and did) 
prejudice the Defendant. 
The case of State v. Strand, 674 P.2d 109 (1983) seems 
to indicate that while the appropriate remedy for facially 
/2 defective charging document is amendment, the Defendant is 
entitled to fair notice of the charges he will be required to 
meet. Citing federal law under United States v. Goldstein, 386 
F. Supp. 833 (D. Delaware 1973), the court makes it clear that 
notice and fair opportunity to defend are the crux of the Sixth 
Amendment. As this court shall see, the fair opportunity to 
defend in this case was denied from the outset, with undue 
liberties afforded the prosecution in presenting otherwise 
inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay under the guise of evidence 
of conspiracy. 
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B. THE PRESIDING JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT A PRELIMINARY HEARING OR TO RESERVE 
THE RIGHT TO RENEW BEFORE THE TRIAL JUDGE 
Again, Tolmanfs position on this issue is extensively 
argued in his Memorandum to the court. (R. 16-26, Addendum A-2.) 
The primary contention of Tolman is that Article I, Section 13 of 
the Utah Constitution allows for such examination to occur, but 
that the legislature has improperly contravened that privilege by 
its enactment of Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Clearly the Utah Constitution controls where subsequent 
legislative enactment contravenes any provision therein. Dean v. 
Rampton, 556 P.2d 205 (1976). Therefore, when Article I, Section 
13 states that offenses shall be prosecuted "by indictment, with 
or without such [preliminary] examination", it is not the prov-
ince of the legislature to proscribe absolutely the availability 
of such examination. Plainly put, if the drafters of the Utah 
Constitution had intended such a course, they would have omitted 
the "with or" phrase for that section. 
The right to preliminary hearing is substantial and 
time-honored. State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 146 P.300 (1915). In 
this case, Tolman chose to exercise that right under the Utah 
Constitution Declaration of Rights (Article I). Legislative 
enactment contravening that right should not bar its exercise, 
/3 
and the court erred in failing to grant Tolman1s motion. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO ORDER A BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Tolman filed a Motion and Memorandum for a Bill of 
Particulars under Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for 
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further information so as to be adequately informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him. (R. 64-67, 89-90; 
Addendum A-3.) Within such filing were specific requests for 
information not contained in the Indictment which became critical 
at trial, and without the benefit of which Tolman was convicted 
of Counts IV and V. The court denied the motion. (R. 275-276.) 
By failing to grant Tolman's request, the trial court 
denied him information sufficient to enable him to prepare his 
defense. State v. Jameson, 103 U. 129, 134 P.2d 173 (1943); 
State v. Strand, (on remand) 720 P.2d 425 (1986). 
This issue is analagous to that found in State v. 
Solomon, 93 U. 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1937). In that case, pursuant to 
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statutory law, defendant demanded a bill of particulars. The 
court ruled, on the basis of the statutory language, that the 
bill of particulars was a right which defendant could demand. 
In the instant case, Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, leaves a discretion with the court as to whether to 
direct on its own motion the filing of a bill of particulars. 
Rule 4(e) goes on now to state that the "request for and contents 
of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of 
factual information needed to set forth the essential elements. . 
." It should have been apparent to the trial court that the 
instant case clearly dictated that further factual information 
was necessary in order for each defendant to prepare his defense, 
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short of an actual presentation of evidence to be used. See 
State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (1977). 
As stated by Appellant Harman in his appeal brief, by 
failing to grant a bill of particulars the trial court wrongly 
failed to limit or circumscribe the area, field or transaction as 
to which the special prosecutors were allowed to offer "evi-
/5 
dence". This resulted in erroneous introduction of a 
hodge-podge of otherwise irrelevant and subjectively formulated 
conclusions. See State v. Spencer, 101 U. 274, 117 P.2d 455 
(1941), reh. denied 101 U. 287, 121 P.2d 912 (1942), overruled on 
other grounds, 4 U.2d 404, 295 P.2d 345 (1956). The product at 
trial was actual prejudice to Tolman and was plain error in light 
of the trial court's failure to grant other discovery requests. 
D. THE COURT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE PRELIMINARY 
QUESTION OF CONSPIRACY, AND THEREFORE ERRED IN ALLOWING 
THE ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY THROUGHOUT TRIAL 
Tolman joins in co-appellant Harman's argument that the 
court failed to properly rule on the issue of the existence of 
any conspiracy. This failure resulted in improper admission of 
voluminous statements ostensibly labeled "co-conspirator state-
ments" under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules of Evidence. As a 
matter of course, Tolman likewise recites his reliance on the 
ruling contained in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (1986) and the 
advisory nature of United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (10th 
Cir. 1986) vis a vis the interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
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It should be further noted that Austin, in relying upon 
the seminal language of United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313 
(10th Cir. 1979), strongly recommends the substantial independent 
evidence required to show conspiracy be established at a 
pre-trial proceeding rather than during the government's case in 
chief. Austin, 786 F.2d at 989-990. Even the prosecution had 
acquiesced that a threshold determination of the conspiracy was 
required before trial. (R. 538, T. 23.) Once again, in a most 
critical fashion, the case at bar diverges from the usual proce-
/ 6 dural course. This, coupled with the courts equivocal finding, 
served to create irreparable prejudice to each defendant on the 
substantive criminal charges. 
In summation, the effects of the failure of the court 
to insure adequate pre-trial discovery are quite clear. Grand 
jury testimony, unilaterally obtained through leading questions, 
was submitted on the theory of some non-existent conspiracy. It 
is safe to say that most or all of this improper evidence would 
not have made it to trial if either a preliminary hearing, bill 
of particulars, or proper 104 motion hearing had been ordered. 
To that extent, Tolman was profoundly prejudiced before the trial 
ever commenced. 
SECTION II - TRIAL ISSUES 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
THE USE OF TOLMAN1S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY 
Tolman believes the error here is plain, and relies 
again on the pleadings submitted at trial. (R. 188-191, 200-205; 
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Addendum A-4.) It is clear from those pleadings and Plaintiff's 
responses that the parties had divergent views as to what hap-
pened around 6:52 p.m. on April 9, 1986. What is revealing, and 
frankly most supportive of Tolmanfs claim, is the instances where 
those accounts coincide. 
Witness Brooks1 notes indicate that upon being informed 
of his subject status, Tolman "was prepared to testify as a 
witness not knowing he was being looked at as a subject". (R. 
238.) Brooks' notes do not reflect, but his testimony recalled, 
that as soon as Tolman was informed of his subject status, he 
stated "color me gone". (R. 537, T. 1027.) Brooks testified 
that Tolman was not given a complete Miranda warning outside the 
grand jury room. (R. 537, T. 1026.) Nor do his notes reflect 
that at any time was Tolman informed outside the grand jury room 
of the specific nature of the charges which were being considered 
against Tolman. (R. 238-240.) 
Upon entry to the grand jury, Tolman was sworn and then 
told he could have counsel present, but that meant outside th ( 
jury room. (R. 243, 1. 15-19.) When asked if he had a chance to 
talk to his attorney, Tolman indicated "yes and no", since he had 
spoken to his attorney earlier in the day, prior to being in-
formed of his "subject" status. (R. 244, 1. 18-23.) Finally, 
the nature of the investigation and the possibility of charges of 
tampering with evidence were mentioned, but never was it clearly 
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stated that Tolman was the "subject" of any specific criminal 
charges. (R. 245, 1. 2-15.) 
The crux of this argument is that a "subject" witness 
before the grand jury is an "accused" and he must be advised of 
all of his rights in light of the potential charges against him. 
State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969 (1967). The court makes two 
observations therein which absolutely pertain to the instant 
case. 
The first, in reciting findings from People v. 
Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 264 N.Y.S.2d 686, is "[i ] f a possible 
defendant or target of an investigation is subpoenaed before a 
grand jury and there testifies, whether or not he claims or 
asserts his privilege against self incrimination, his constitu-
tional privilege is deemed violated." I_d. at 690. This state-
ment indicates that the violation commences upon the issuance of 
a subpoena to appear without prior acknowledgement of "subject" 
status. The fact that Tolman was informed, however inadequately, 
of that status just prior to his scheduled appearance does not 
cure the defect. Nor is it clear from the testimony and notes of 
Lorin Brooks that his choice to remain was voluntary. "Color me 
gone" evidences, however colloquially, a desire to vacate the 
premises. Likewise, the special prosecutors admonitions inside 
the grand jury room ring hollow when they are closely scru-
tinized. 
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The second and equally compelling observation made by 
the court has to do with waiver. It states: 
"It would seem that a witness who is unaware 
that he is a target of a grand jury inves-
tigation could not intelligently determine 
whether or not he needed counsel unless he 
was fully advised of the charges being 
considered against him; and until he has full 
knowledge regarding that matter, he will not 
know when to assert his constitutional claim 
of privilege against self-incrimination. It 
would be difficult to believe that he could 
intelligently waive the right to counsel 
under such circumstances." [Emphasis added.] 
429 P.2d at 975. 
In this instance, Tolman could neither waive his 
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rights, nor could he freely and voluntarily elect not to. 
The apparently universal standard for waiver of a 
fundamental constitutional right is "knowing and intelligent" 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1969); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 
L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). This pertains not only to the knowledge and 
understanding of the actual rights involved, but also how they 
interface with the nature of the charge. The Utah Supreme Court 
has recently assessed that to mean "real notice of the true 
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally 
recognized requirement of due process". [Citation omitted.] 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 at 1312 (1987). It would have 
been impossible for Tolman to make a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of his right to silence or his right to consult and have 
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counsel present, since the "real" nature of the charges was never 
explained to him. For this court to infer from the brief record 
of the grand jury appearance what was meant by the cursory 
admonition is to engage in the kind of speculation v/hich Gibbons 
proscribes. The error of the court in allowing segments of 
Tolman's grand jury testimony to be read into the record as 
admissions was plain error of constitutional magnitude, which 
taken in light of the whole record, cannot be said to be harm-
less. State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). 
B. EXHIBITS 30, 31 and 32 WERE NEVER PROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE FOR JUROR SCRUTINY 
Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 (excerpts of Tolman's grand jury 
testimony) were introduced by the prosecutor and read into the 
record by the court clerk. (R. 530, T. 33-56.) Exclusive of the 
foregoing discussion, at no place on the record are these exhib-
its properly offered nor does the court ever rule them re-
/9 ceived/ For that reason, those exhibits and their reference in 
the record should be stricken and not further considered by this 
court as part of the evidence adduced against Tolman. 
C. THE COURT ERRED ON SPECIFIC RULINGS 
REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
MATERIAL TO THE CHARGES AGAINST TOLMAN 
Throughout trial, objections were routinely raised 
regarding admission of certain documentary and testimonial 
evidence. Court rulings on evidence will only be considered 
harmful error if there is showing that it had a substantial 
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influence in bringing about the verdict. State v. Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56 (1982) . 
Mike Christensen took the stand prepared to testify 
about observations and conversations he had had with Tolman 
during August, 1983. These occurrences exactly coincided with 
the time frame when all of Tolman's alleged illegal conduct was 
supposed to have been transpiring. Through some tortured manipu-
lation of Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence, the prosecution 
convinced an obviously fatigued court that for Mr. Christensen to 
testify as to what lie said and observed was improper. The ruling 
is absurd, and effectively negated all the relevant testimony 
of Christensen on the most critical issues of the case. 
D. TOLMANfS CONVICTION ON COUNT IV CANNOT STAND 
BECAUSE 76-8-508(1)(b) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR 
THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THAT COUNT 
Tolman1s conviction on Count IV was predicated upon 
conduct which is not proscribed by §76-8-508(1)(b). A literal 
reading of that portion of the statute fails to adequately inform 
what conduct is prohibited. If, however, the statute is held to 
adequately give notice of what constitutes criminal conduct, the 
court erred in failing to instruct the jury that attempts to 
induce a withholding of evidence must relate to the official 
proceeding believed to be pending, 
1. Section 76-8-508(1)(b) is overly broad and vague so 
as to be declared unconstitutional. 
In this case, Tolman was convicted of violating 
76-8-508(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated (as amended) which provides: 
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"A person is guilty of a felony in the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or other-
wise cause a person to: 
* * * 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, 
document or thing; . • ." 
That portion of the statute is unconstitutionally vague 
and overly broad. Sub part (b) mandates that no "testimony, 
information, document, or thing" may be withheld. The question 
is, withheld from what? One can only presume the legislature 
meant withheld from the official proceeding believed to be 
pending or about to be instituted. As shall be demonstrated, the 
absence of some clear nexus between subpart (b) and subsection 
(1) makes it a crime to have a belief coupled with an unrelated 
act. 
Traditionally, constitutionality of statutes must be 
presented to the District Court before they can be raised on 
appeal. Salt Lake City v. Perkins, 9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d 1106 
(1959); Neilson v. Eisen, 116 Utah 343, 209 P.2d 928 (1949); 
Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971). This rule 
applies unless the statute is so plainly unconstitutional that 
failure to raise the issue sua sponte on the part of the District 
Court is considered clear error. State v. Laird, 601 P.2d 926, 
927, n. 6 (1979); see Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807 (8th 
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Cir. 1960). The court may entertain an issue sua sponte as an 
exception to the rule that constitutional objections must be 
raised at the trial level before being raised for the first time 
on appeal if the court considers the constitutional right to be 
of momentous concern. State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (1982); 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970); State v. 
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936). 
This rule has been applied less stringently, however, 
in more recent cases. In State v. Fritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 
P.2d 806 (1970), because the defendant did not raise the issue of 
the statute's validity at the trial court level or at the appeal 
level, the court held there was no justification for dealing with 
that issue. It could be inferred from reading the court's 
decision that if the defendant had raised the issue of the 
statute's unconstitutionality at either level, the court would 
have felt justified in making a determination of the issue. 
Therefore, even though the defendant did not raise the issue at 
trial, the reviewing court may have proceeded to deal with the 
constitutionality of the statute, for the first time, at the 
appeal level of the proceeding. 
The Supreme Court in State v. Laird, 601 P.2d 926 
(1979), held that the defendant was precluded from challenging 
the constitutionality of a "carnal knowledge" statute because he 
did not raise the issue for a determination by the District 
Court, or make any motion or objection to that court which would 
-24-
"remotely preserve this issue for our determination". Ij3. at 
927. The court was looking for any objection or motion, however 
remote, to support a determination of this issue. In the instant 
case, Tolman took the occasion to object on the record to the 
instruction, stating that it created an offense out of a mere 
belief coupled with an unrelated act, or "strict liability". (R. 
532, T. 1428.) By that, Tolman sought to preserve this issue and 
is entitled to raise it here. 
The recent decision of State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 
440 (1983), held: "[T]he general rule that constitutional issues 
not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to 
when a person's liberty is at stake". I^d. at 443; citing Pratt 
v. City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (1981). 
An earlier case supported this precedent, which involved an 
appellant attacking the constitutionality of a Utah statute and 
it was decided that if the liberty of an appellant is jeop-
ardized, constitutional issues may be raised for the first time 
on appeal. In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963). 
"[E]ven in the absence of proper objection, we may review error 
in the interests of justice to protect a valuable constitutional 
right." State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (1986); State v. Schad, 
supra; State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
A statute this vague falls within the confines of the 
standards set out by the Supreme Court for finding a statute 
unconstitutional State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981), 
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held that, "[I]n order to find a statute unconstitutionally 
vague, this court must determine that it 'failed to inform an 
ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the 
conduct sought to be prescribed.1" I_d. at 515, citing State v. 
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1975). An ordinary citizen 
would be unclear as to what "thing" included or excluded, and 
certainly could not be able to express what act relates to what 
proceeding. This drafting is unconstitutional because of its 
facial ambiguity. "There is no doubt that a statute that affec 
fundamental liberties is unconstitutional if it is so vague tha 
persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning." State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1983); 
In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1971); State v. Packard, 
122 Utah 369, 374, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952). "When a state 
action impinges on fundamental rights, due process requires 
standards which clearly define the scope of permissible conduct 
so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." In Re 
Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1087-88. 
The United States Supreme Court has aptly stated: 
"It is established that a law fails to meet 
the requirements of the Due Process clause if 
it is so vague and standardless that it 
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct 
it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free 
to decide, without any legally fixed stan-
dards, what is prohibited and what is not in 
each particular case." 
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Id. at 1088, citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 401, 
402-03 (1966); See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972). 
The statute in question has once been scrutinized for 
constitutional validity, albeit regarding subsections (l)(d). 
State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (1981). While Tolman intends to 
rely upon Carlsen to support his argument, the most obvious 
difference between that case and this is both subsection (1) and 
subpart (d) refer to a "proceeding", thus demonstrating the 
legislative intent to tie the belief to the act with a common 
proceeding as the conduit. Clearly, such is not the case with 
subsections (l)(b). 
The court in Carlsen indicated that a statute similar 
to our own had been upheld against constitutional challenges in 
State v. Stroh, 91 Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182 (1979). That case 
construes a statute which is drafted in such a fashion as to 
/ll foreclose any argument of vagueness or overbreadth. In Stroh, 
the court ruled that the statute need not expressly include as an 
element the intent to obstruct justice, since the legislature 
determined that "attempts to influence a witness to change his 
testimony or to absent himself from a trial or other official 
proceeding, necessarily have as their purpose and it is their 
natural tendency to obstruct justice". The court goes on to 
state that "the intent to perform the acts proscribed by the 
statute, with knowledge or reason to believe that the person is 
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or probably is about to be called as a witness, conclusively 
shows an intent to obstruct justice". [Emphasis added.] Id. 
It cannot be gainsaid that §76-8-508(1)(d) severs the 
marriage between such knowledge or belief and the conduct pro-
scribed. Plainly read, any person who knows any official pro-
ceeding is pending and attempts to induce or otherwise cause any 
person to withhold any testimony, information, document or thing 
/12 
has committed a third degree felony. For that reason, the 
court is compelled to find this statute vague and overly broad, 
and thus held unconstitutional. Therefore, Tolman's conviction 
cannot stand. 
2. The court erred by giving Instruction Number 3d in 
favor of Tolmanfs offered instruction. 
Even if the statute in question passes constitutional 
muster, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the 
inducement necessarily relates to the official proceeding. Rule 
19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure indicates that error may 
be assigned to instruction with or without objection. State v. 
Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). In that case, this court 
stated that improper instructions were used which "violate due 
process because they relate to the issue of guilt and relieve the 
State of its burden of proof." I_d. at 1045. As in Turner, the 
instant case demonstrates an occasion where the instruction 
employed absolved the prosecution from their burden. The proof 
required should have been a showing that the alleged acts were 
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somehow related to, and done with knowledge or belief that, the 
official proceeding would be affected. Due to this deficient 
threshold of proof, Tolman was convicted on Count IV despite a 
more than reasonable doubt of his guilt. 
SECTION III. - PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT 
The general conduct of state's prosecutors Keller and 
Snow, during the grand jury proceedings and at the trial itself 
created such substantial prejudice to Appellant Tolman that 
reversal is the only available remedy. 
Some of the conduct complained of hereinafter became 
apparent during the proceedings below and were timely raised, 
however, the court declined to grant Appellant's requested 
relief, i.e., mistrial, dismissal, suppression of evidence, etc. 
or granted prosecution requests which were prejudicial to Appel-
lant's defense and anathema to Appellant's statutory and consti-
tutional rights. The incidents of prosecutorial misconduct 
and/or errant rulings of the court as set forth hereafter ar-
guably rise to the level of reversible error in each case and 
clearly reach that level cumulatively. 
A. APPELLANT TOLMAN WAS SINGLED OUT IN THE 
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS TO BE DENIED 
NOTICE AND EFFECTIVE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Since this issue is more extensively addressed else-
where in Appellant's brief, (see Argument, II, A, supra), a 
summary is provided merely to demonstrate the initiation of the 
prosecution's pattern of conduct directed toward denial of 
Appellant Tolman's right to the due process of law. 
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In short, Appellant Tolman was the only "target" who 
did not receive advance notice of that fact; the only witness who 
was denied the right to have counsel present; and the only 
eventual Defendant who was not fully apprised of the nature of 
the prospective charges, 
B. THE PROSECUTION ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK APPELLANT 
TOLMANfS RIGHT TO DISCOVERY AND CONCEALED 
POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AT ALL STAGES 
Defendant Tolman filed his Motion for Discovery pursu-
ant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, on December 1, 
1986. (R. 59, 60.) 
Rule 16, in pertinent part states that the prosecutor 
"shall disclose to the defense . . . (4) Evidence known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, (or) 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant." 
The prosecution opposed providing Appellant with 
transcripts of the testimony of grand jury witnesses, although 
potentially exculpatory, on various bases. (See R. 128-134.) A 
hearing on Appellant's motion was held on January 30, 1987. The 
prosecution argued at various stages that the prosecution should 
determine which portions of testimony were relevant and poten-
tially exculpatory; or that the judge should do so; or that 
defense counsel be allowed inspection of transcripts under the 
continual physical supervision of the prosecution. 
Following the hearing, the court ordered the prose-
cution to supply copies of all grand jury transcripts with any 
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reference to the Appellant. (See Supplemental Order, R. 165, 
166.) Said Order exceeded Rule 16 requirements, clearly obligat-
ing the prosecution to diligently insure that all transcripts of 
testimony be provided to the defense irrespective of the prose-
cution's opinion as to whether the testimony was exculpatory. 
In the weeks to come, the prosecution purported to 
provide Appellant with copies of all grand jury transcripts, or 
portions thereof, which reported the testimony of witnesses whose 
testimony purported to inculpate, exculpate or otherwise touch 
upon the facts relevant to the Tolman case. At least, those 
transcripts were represented by the prosecution to fully encom-
pass those issues. 
Counsel for Appellant Tolman, however, learned in 
mid-trial, (the afternoon of February 25, 1987) that a signifi-
cant witness, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Mike Christensen, 
had not only given testimony to the grand jury which was 
exculpatory in nature, he had done so on more than one occasion. 
Further, and even more compelling, the prosecution contacted Mr. 
Christensen on February 17, 1987, just prior to trial, to ask why 
he was listed as a defense witness, whereupon he made direct 
reference to his grand jury testimony concerning his considerable 
involvement with the Appellant including testimony which was not 
only exculpatory but was in direct contradiction to the prose-
cutions version of the facts concerning Appellant Tolman's 
disclosure of the evidence alleged to have been tampered with, 
i.e., the "hidden" fire reports. 
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Beginning at page 1037, line 22 of the trial transcript 
and concluding at page 1055 is the full scenario of Appellant!s 
discovery of said concealment, proffer of the above-stated facts, 
oral Motion to Dismiss and argument of counsel. 
In addition to Mr. Christensen!s testimony, it was also 
learned that the exculpatory testimony of eventual defense 
witnesses Shauna Clark and Jim Burns had been concealed, (or at 
least not disclosed), both of whom provided testimony which 
tended to negate or mitigate Appellant's guilt. 
The court (unreported) remedied the failures to dis-
close by requiring the prosecution to comply with the discovery 
order of January 30, 1987, by providing the relevant grand jury 
transcripts to Appellant forthwith. 
Although the testimony of the above three witnesses is 
reported at pages 1160 to 1219 of the trial transcript, it is the 
fact of the concealment, not the substance of the testimony that 
is at issue. 
C. THE PROSECUTION MADE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO 
PREVENT DEFENSE WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING, 
IN PART SUCCESSFUL DUE TO THE COURT'S ERRORS 
On the morning of February 27, 1987, Shauna Clark 
appeared to testify at trial. She then provided Appellant's 
counsel with a report of two conversations she had with Prosecu-
tor Keller: 
1. On the previous evening he contacted her to inquire 
as to what her testimony would be on behalf of Appellant. 
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She also stated that Mr. Keller admonished her that her 
testimony in this case could adversely impact "her" case then 
pending. (Criminal and civil prosecutions against former county 
attorney Ted Cannon alleging sexual misconduct by him against 
her.) 
2. Ms. Clark reported that in a courtroom foyer 
conversation that morning, before trial convened, Mr. Keller 
told her her being called as a witness was a defense publicity 
ploy and that the judge would not allow her to be called as a 
witness and that, therefore, she could leave. (Ms. Clark was 
under subpoena at the time.) 
Prior to commencement of trial that morning, counsel 
convened iin camera at Mr. Keller's request whereupon he indeed, 
albeit unsuccessfully, argued for Ms. Clark's disqualification 
based on the "grandstanding" issue. Counsel for Appellant 
reported the Keller/Clark discussion and raised objections at 
that time, to the undue influence of Mr. Keller regarding the 
reported Clark discussions but no misconduct was perceived by the 
court. 
Clark's later testimony substantially controverted the 
testimony of Sam Dawson, a crucial state's witness, and attacked 
Mr. Dawson's credibility, honesty and motive (bias). (T. Tr. 
1160-1170.) 
Not only did Prosecutor Keller first fail to disclose 
probative transcripts of testimony, then attempt to block Clark's 
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testimony, extrajudicially and by oral motion, (frivolously so in 
light of his knowledge of Ms, Clark's testimony), his disingenu-
ous and misleading abuse of the Rules of Evidence was demonstrat-
ed during the testimony of Mssrs. Burns and Christensen. 
Each of the above-named such witnesses were called by 
Tolman to rebut the prosecution claim that Appellant Tolman 
concealed the fact that he had been ordered to suppress his 
official report by providing testimony that Tolman had, in fact, 
quite openly and boisterously reported and condemned said order 
and sought the advice of his peers (and legal counsel) concerning 
the efficacy of same. 
Each witness was asked to recall their respective 
conversations with Mr. Tolman on that subject. Mr. Keller raised 
hearsay objections throughout the examinations as to testimony 
regarding what the witness or Appellant Tolman said in said 
discussions. 
Appellant sought to adduce from each witness the 
Appellant's statements (made contemporaneous to the order regard-
ing suppression of his initial fire report) regarding Tolman1s 
state of mind, opinions, and assertions of potential evidence 
tampering by his supervisors and of reporting the same. At a 
sidebar conference during Mr. Burns1 testimony (T. Tr. 1184) the 
court ruled that Appellant Tolman1s statements were inadmissible 
hearsay. Therefore, direct examination ceased. 
Inexplicably, the court allowed the next witness, Mr. 
Christensen to so testify. However, the Burns testimony related 
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to additional discussions of import and therefore its omission 
was not remedied by the admission of Christensen!s testimony. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay (Rule 801, 
et seq.) are not so mysterious as to require a protracted dis-
cussion. It is the emerging pattern of obstructing the airing of 
admissible evidence that is important. More importantly, the bad 
faith prosecution motives and further tainting of due process, 
(as discussed infra), has clearly taken the leap from the 
pre-trial stage and invaded the fair and full presentment of both 
sides cases in full view of the trial jury. 
Mr. Keller chose to "testify" that Appellant had not 
expressed his suspicions or unhappiness regarding the "sup-
pressed" fire report to the lawyers and investigators in the 
county attorney's office yet continually and frivolously invoked 
the Rules of Evidence to prevent the testimony of witnesses to 
the contrary to be discovered, provided or offered. 
D. THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCES TO APPELLANT TOLMAN'S 
ABILITY TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN BEHALF WERE SUFFICIENTLY 
PREJUDICIAL, ALONE, TO REQUIRE A MISTRIAL AND THE 
COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DO SO WAS ERROR 
In the previous discussion regarding Mr. Keller's 
hearsay objection to the testimony of witness Christensen as to 
prior statements of Appellant Tolman, Mr. Keller, in the presence 
of the jury declared, " . . . I understand Mr. Tolman is going 
to testify. He can certainly tell us all about it himself." (T. 
Tr. 1205.) (Mr. Keller had previously made a similar reference 
in support of the same objection when the previous witness, Mr. 
-35-
Burns, was testifying.) Defense counsel reserved the objection 
for in camera argument as to the misconduct of the prosecutorfs 
comments vis1 a vis1 a mistrial. 
The unreported in camera argument was noted on the 
record when the court reconvened. (T. Tr. 1225.) The oral 
motion for mistrial was taken under advisement. Appellantfs 
written motion and memorandum were filed with the court on March 
30, 1987. (R. 470.) The court denied Appellant Tolman's motion, 
The prosecution argued, in essence, that Appellant had 
waived his privilege of silence because Appellant's counsel had 
expressed or implied that Appellant would testify, both in his 
opening statement to the jury and in jLri camera discussions of 
counsel and the court. 
A review of the opening statement reflects that Appel-
lant's counsel was clear in advising the jury of Appellant's 
right not to testify and even stated that it would not be proper 
to report his expected testimony since the decision to testify 
had not been made. The jury was only advised as to the expected 
testimony of other witnesses as to Appellant's defense. (See 
transcript of opening statements, February 18, 1987.) 
Appellant's list of expected witnesses, filed on 
February 17, 1987, conspicuously omits his own name. (R. 460.) 
As to the state's reliance on In camera revelations or 
inferences that Tolman planned to testify in his own behalf as 
justification for the comments before the jury, a number of 
things can be said: 
-36-
1. There is no such record; 
2. Even if such statements or inferences were made, 
there is a distinct reason they occurred outside the presence of 
the jury - that is why legal arguments and proffers are done in 
camera or at the sidebar - to prevent the jury from hearing them. 
3. Further, any such statements made after Mr, 
Keller's comments are hardly surprising. Once the jury is told 
the Appellant will testify, decisions of the defense become 
easier. The damage is done. 
E. THE AUTHORITY SUPPORTS REVERSAL 
1• Privilege Against Testifying. 
Under Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution and 
Amendment V of the United States Constitution, a defendant in a 
prosecution has the absolute right and privilege of remaining 
silent, free of an adverse inference attaching to that silence. 
As corollary, it is an elemental tenet of defendant's right to 
remain silent that any direct comment by the prosecution regard-
ing the exercise of that right is substantial and prejudicial 
error. State v. Long, 29 U.2d 177, 506 P.2d 1269 (1973); State 
v. Bennett, 582 P.2d 569 (Wash. 1978); State v. Morris, 577 
S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1979); State v. McRae, 231 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. 
1977); Prince v. State, 620 P.2d 431 (Okla. 1980); Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 418 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1980). The vast body of case law 
references comment by the prosecution during closing argument 
upon defendant's failure to testify. Such is not the case here, 
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but the comment itself is no less prejudicial under the circum-
stances. 
As noted in many Utah cases, assertion of a privilege 
at any stage of the proceeding is not subject to commentary by 
the prosecution, and such comment creates prejudicial error. 
State v. Brown, 14 U.2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963); State v. 
Trusty, 28 U.2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972); State v. Eaton, 569 
P.2d 1114 (1977). The standard for determining whether prejudice 
warranting a new trial has arisen is stated in Eaton: 
w[W]hen there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the error below was prejudicial, that 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. This is especially true where the 
error involved is one that trangresses 
against the exercise of a constitutional 
right. Consequently, the rule which we have 
numerous times stated is that if the error is 
such as to justify a belief that it had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the defen-
dant's right to fair trial, in that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
there may have been a different result, then 
the error should not be regarded as harmless; 
and conversely, if the error is such that it 
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it 
was harmless in that the result would have 
been the same, then the error should not be 
deemed prejudicial and warrant granting a new 
trial." 
569 P.2d at 1116. 
An example is found in Brown, supra, which involved a 
case of defendant invoking spousal privilege. The prosecutor 
commented to the jury that defendant's wife was the one person 
who corroborated defendant's alibi. In its ruling reversing the 
conviction, the court stated: 
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"If such comment is permissible, the privi-
lege is largely destroyed. We conclude that 
this comment destroyed the privilege to not 
testify and was prejudicial.n 
383 P.2d at 932. 
In this case, Defendant had called witnesses in his 
behalf but had not yet testified himself. Upon prosecution's 
hearsay objection, Defendant, through counsel, exercised the 
Fifth Amendment privilege to demonstrate Defendant's unavailabil-
ity. See State v. White, 671 P.2d 191 (1983). By commenting 
before the jury that the witness need not testify because the 
Defendant could, the privilege was improperly and irretrievably 
invaded. At that point, the privilege not to testify was effec-
tively wrested from the Defendant so as to avoid the otherwise 
impermissible inference to be drawn by the jury. (The damage was 
furthered by the court's discussion of Keller's comments at the 
time.) Rather than rest upon the statements of his witnesses, 
the Defendant was compelled to testify to overcome the prosecu-
tor's comments, as well as corroborate his witnesses' statements 
which were objected to on hearsay grounds. 
The determination of this issue is one which should be 
closely scrutinized by this Court, in light of the standard 
espoused in Eaton, supra, since the court has "his advantaged 
position in proximity to the trial, and his responsibility of 
seeing that the proceedings are carried on in a way which will 
best serve the purpose of seeking the truth and doing justice by 
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seeing that both sides are given a fair trial . . ." Brownf 502 
P.2d at 114. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Appellant's Motion for Mistrial on this issue alone. 
2. Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence. 
The court's discovery order of January 27, 1987 and the 
mandate of Rule 16, both discussed supra, leaves an unequivocal 
duty of broad, non-discretionary disclosure of the identities and 
recorded grand jury testimony of any witness even conceivably 
likely to be a witness with evidence beneficial to the defense. 
In State v. Jerrell, 808 P.2d 18 (Utah 1980), a case in 
which the prosecutor withheld potentially exculpatory evidence, 
the court strongly condemned any attempt to withhold such evi-
dence irrespective of the weight given to it by the prosecutor. 
The court recognized the controlling issue as being the need to 
air all evidence before the trier of fact whether probative of 
guilt or innocence. 
Jerrell was cited in Walker v. State of Utah, 624 P.2d 
687 (Utah 1981) in reversing a conviction due to the withholding 
of potentially exculpatory evidence. The Walker court held that 
that kind of prosecutor misconduct is a violation of the substan-
tive due process right. The court could find no effective 
distinction between the failure to disclose testimony favorable 
to the accused and the outright offering of false testimony to 
the contrary. 
-40-
The importance of the undisclosed testimony is inherent 
in the fact that the only witnesses, besides himself, called by 
this defendant, were the three witnesses whose recorded testimony 
was undisclosed. 
The most recent pronouncement of this Court, State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (1987), further demonstrates the court's 
refusal to tolerate prosecutor misconduct evidencing a denial of 
a full and fair trial by playing "hide and seek" with discover-
able evidence. 
Even if, as the prosecution has argued, the 
non-disclosure was due to an oversight or an error in judgment 
the results are no less prejudicial. 
However, it is difficult to conceive that Appellant 
Tolman's only three witnesses were the only ones whose testimony 
was overlooked by the prosecution, especially where it was called 
to their attention by specific reference of one witness just 
before trial. It also is an attenuated definition of coincidence 
to assume that Appellant Tolman was the only Appellant to be 
deprived of counsel, receive notice, etc. 
3. Cumulative Misconduct. 
Although certain of these arguments, if successful, 
would customarily result in a new trial this Court must recognize 
that taken as a whole, the deprivation of due process is so 
substantial as to demand dismissal. This is especially true when 
coupled with the wholesale error and unfairness present in error 
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not assignable to the prosecution which occurred throughout the 
proceedings below: No notice of charges before the grand jury; 
denial of counsel; denial of a preliminary hearing and a bill of 
particulars; determination of relevance of grand jury witness 
testimony placed in the prosecution; mid-trial discovery of 
concealed evidence; pattern of bad faith obstruction of full 
airing of evidence; erroneous and inconsistent rulings on ob-
jections and motions; continual "testimony" of prosecutors 
including interjection of otherwise inadmissible and/or priv-
ileged information; knowing use of biased witnesses; a jury 
relying on divine revelation instead of the evidence; attempts by 
the prosecutor to dissuade a witness from testifying, to enumer-
ate a few. 
The prosecution's best response - closely related to 
their explanation for solely denying Appellant Tolman counsel 
before the grand jury as being due to their having been then not 
yet being fully acquainted with the state law on grand juries -
sums up the lame, but only viable alternative to assignment of 
intentional misconduct: 
"We're not regular prosecutors . . . I am a defense 
attorney a lot myself now." (Mr. Keller, T. Tr. 1047.) 
SECTION IV - POST-TRIAL ISSUES 
Appellant Tolman filed a motion to arrest the judgment 
herein pursuant to Rule 23, U.R.Cr.P., on March 30, 1987, based 
upon improper jury deliberations. 
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The Appellant's memorandum and juror affidavit filed in 
support of said motion focused on the issue of mistaken interpre-
tation of the "hung jury" instruction. The court ruled that it 
would not entertain the motion where (a) the juror providing the 
affidavit was unavailable in court for cross-examination and (b) 
an improper outside influence was not shown. 
Appellant supplemented his motion by affidavit of juror 
Karl Andersen, dated August 14, 1987. (R. 554-556.) A 
re-hearing was scheduled for August 19, 1987 and Mr. Andersen and 
another juror, Colleen Rosvall, were present pursuant to subpoe-
na. 
The arguments of counsel were heard rn camera. The 
affidavit of Mr. Andersen was filed with the court and the 
corroborative testimony of Ms. Rosvall were proffered. Each 
juror's testimony went to the issue of improper outside influence 
occasioned by the insertion of "God" in the jury room via a group 
prayer which resulted in the prayer-leader juror's inspiration or 
revelation from God that Appellant Tolman was guilty. It was 
proffered that the inspired juror asserted a great degree of 
authority by virtue of his position in the dominant and (appar-
ently) mutual religion (Mormon) of five other jurors whose 
opinions were then changed to adopt the divinely inspired lead-
er's conclusion. Due to the obvious immovable decision of the 
other jurors, the mistaken belief that a hung jury was not 
possible and the pressure of prospect of spending eternity in 
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deliberation, the two "uninspired" jurors acquiesced in the 
verdict in spite of their belief that Tolman was not guilty. 
The court also revealed that, unknown to Tolman's 
counsel, the jury requested a dictionary to ascertain the defini-
tion of certain terms set out in the jury instructions. The 
court allowed a dictionary to be delivered to the jury for that 
narrow purpose. Appellant argued the impropriety and prejudice 
of that event, as well, by oral supplement. 
Mr. Snow, arguing for the State, urged the court to 
deny the motion on the grounds that Appellant had not demonstrat-
ed prejudicial outside influence or other improper juror or 
judicial conduct and that it would be improper to consider the 
juror affidavit. Mr. Snow stated that even if the jury's verdict 
was the result of divine inspiration, "who are we to argue with 
God?" 
In propounding the arguments herein, Appellant is 
cognizant of Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, which states, 
in pertinent part, that juror testimony may not be used to 
inquire into the validity of the jury's verdict, " . . . except 
that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought 
to bear upon any juror." 
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A. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR JURORS1 
TESTIMONY ON THE QUESTION OF "OUTSIDE INFLUENCE" 
It is an undeniable fact of life in the State of Utah 
that one religion dominates virtually all aspects of life. The 
State Legislature openly acknowledges that the approval of the 
Mormon Church's heirarchy is a prerequisite to successful passage 
of proposed laws touching upon that religion's tenets. 
It is also common knowledge that that church adheres to 
a male-only priesthood which governs on the premise that the 
church president is a prophet and rules with divine inspiration 
and authority which flows from him to the faithful via the 
priesthood. That doctrine is clearly understood in that no 
m <mber is empowered to assert the authority of God absent the 
requisite leve: : of the priesthood conferred upon him. It is 
equally understood that the assertion of the power of the 
priesthood is authoritative, i.e.f done "in the name of Jesus 
Christ". 
The import of the Andersen affidavit is clear and 
manifold: 
1. A jury, after many hours of deliberation, was 6-2 
for acquittal; 
2. A juror who asserted his spiritual authority in the 
said religion influenced his fellow adherents to submit the 
question of guilt to the will of God by joining him in group 
prayer; 
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3. Immediately following the prayer, the said juror 
expressed the "answer" to the prayer, i.e., that Appellant was 
guilty. 
4. Soon thereafter, all prayer participants changed 
their opinions to adhere to the "will of God". A 6-2 vote became 
2-6 without further evidentiary considerations. 
5. The six, clearly immovable from an "inspired" 
position, were able to force to two to give in. 
Whether or not the influence of the prayer-leader's 
expressions of spiritual authority which gave rise to the prayer 
or his declaration of the divine "truth" were improper influences 
or whether the inclusion of God in the deliberations was improper 
should have at least been examined by the court. By excluding 
the jurors1 testimony, a proper question of extraneous matters or 
outside influence was ignored. 
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OP THE JURORS1 PRAYER AND 
RELIANCE ON DIVINE REVELATION ARE ERROR 
When a juror, during deliberations, expresses to his 
fellow jurors facts as being within his personal knowledge and 
those facts are material are shown to have influenced the jurors1 
votes, the verdict should be vacated. Martin v. State, 113 So. 
602; Ross v. State, 95 So.2d 594; Briggs v. State, 338 S.W.2d 
625; State v. Malone, 62 S.W.2d 625. 
By first convincing the other jurors to submit the fate 
of the accused to prayer, the juror demonstrated that the jury 
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was influenced to rely not upon the authority of the court and 
their instructions, but to allow the "priesthood" to utilize its 
power to seek answers from an outside authority. 
When the offending juror then revealed the outside 
authority's answers, he was doing so as a conduit of God since 
only he was privy to the answers. In communicating his "personal 
knowledge" in such a fashion, the jurors were precluded from 
weighing the evidence. Smith v. Covell, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377 
(1980). 
The improper effect of the prayer may be viewed in any 
number of ways: 
1. The knowledge imparted to the jury through its 
"messenger" (the spiritual leader) was additional evidence from 
an unsworn witness (God). In that case evidence was received 
outside the forum of open court and the verdict must be inval-
idated. Tunmore v. McLeish, 187 P. 443. 
2. God was present in the jury room as a ninth juror. 
In this case the revelation was only one vote. But who's going 
to disagree with God? Besides, only eight jurors are permissi-
ble. 
3. God (or the priesthood thereof) assumed dominion 
over the conduct of the proceedings. It is apparent that four 
jurors acquiesced to the authority of the priesthood in relying 
on the prayer then changed their votes according to the guidance 
of the prayer leader. If the due process of law was being 
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administrated by the authority of the Mormon priesthood, the 
inviolate doctrine of separation of church and state is prejudi-
cially tainted. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 4. 
4. The verdict was submitted to chance. Implicit in 
the vote swing is the conclusion that a vote of acquittal would 
have followed the divine revelation of "not guilty". 
Therefore, the six jurors were flipping a spiritual 
coin. If God says "guilty" (heads) we vote for conviction . . . 
if God says innocent (tails) we vote for acquittal. Chance 
verdicts are verdicts submitted to decisions determined by the 
outcome of a non-evidentiary event such as a coin flip. Chance 
verdicts are impermissible. State v. Gee, 28 U.2d 96 (1972); 
State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 
P.2d 598 (Utah 1983). 
5. The juror who received the revelation from God 
engaged in an unpermitted conversation. Prejudice will be 
presumed from any contact between jurors and others that goes 
beyond mere incidental, unintended conduct. State v. Erickson, 
73 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, (December 31, 1987.) 
In this case the "conversation" was intended and was 
engaged for a substantial purpose, i.e., to seek the ultimate 
answers. 
C. THE VERDICT RESULTED FROM IMPROPER 
TAINT AND IMPLIED INTIMIDATION 
The Andersen affidavit shows that he never believed in 
Appellant's guilt but changed his vote after several days of 
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deliberation only because of the clear prospect of spending 
eternity in the jury room once the divine intervention created 
the intractable position of the majority coupled with the errone-
ous belief that the jury could not "hang". A new trial should be 
granted where all but one juror has found a verdict of guilty, 
and that one juror finally agrees on such a verdict because he 
was, in a sense intimidated into voting for conviction. Bell v. 
State, 161 S.W.2d 109 (Texas). 
The intimidation factor should be examined with greater 
concern given the length of the deliberation herein as well as 
the late hour of the verdict. 
D. THE COURTfS DELIVERING A 
DICTIONARY TO THE JURY WAS ERROR 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is misconduct 
for the court to allow the jury to receive a dictionary during 
its deliberations. State v. Donald, 63 P.2d 246 (Utah, 1936). 
That court found the court's misconduct to be harmless. However, 
in this case the error was not learned by Appellant until the 
jury was long-since excused and the record silent as to the 
circumstances. The silence should not be inferred as being 
non-prejudicial. 
E. THE CUMULATIVE ERROR REGARDING 
JURY DELIBERATIONS WEIGHS PREJUDICIAL 
The jury in this case retired to the jury room having 
heard prosecutor comments which invaded Appellant's privilege 
against testifying. It therefore heard testimony it might not 
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have. It heard hearsay evidence on the premise it was only 
relevant to the conspiracy charge. Yet the jury found no con-
spiracy. So its deliberations undoubtedly included weighing 
hearsay evidence on the substantive charges. 
It received evidence and instructions to which Appel-
lant assigns error. It relied on evidence which had been con-
cealed from the defense until shortly before it was presented. 
This was a jury which was unaware it could "hang" and 
only agreed on a verdict after days of deliberation into the wee 
hours after improperly viewing a dictionary and after following 
the guidance of the extrajudicial authority of a spiritual leader 
who claimed to speak not from the evidence but from God. 
The cumulative error relating to the conduct of the 
jury deliberations weighs heavily in favor of reversing this 
verdict. Although the burden of invading the jury room is a 
strong one, the scrutiny with which the court should examine the 
possibility of outside influence is immediate and careful. The 
Erickson court affirmed the principle that any apparent influence 
beyond the incidental, unavoidable circumstance will necessarily 
negate the verdict of the jury. In spite of the deference given 
to the province of the jury, harmless error will never be 
presumed when it is shown that even one juror may have relied on 
something other than the evidence. 
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SECTION V - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION ON COUNTS IV AND V 
Again, Tolman raises an issue addressed by his 
co-appellant, Harman, and joins that argument. The evidence 
overwhelmingly exculpates Tolman from any criminal liability 
under Counts IV and V. Vis a vis those charges the following 
salient events were described at trial: 
1. Dean Larsen investigates the Fashion Place fire and 
makes a public statement about cause and origin. 
2. Jim Ashby is hired by county as an independent fire 
investigator and refutes Larsen's statement, resulting in public-
ity adversely affecting Larsen. 
3. Ashby solicits Tolman to play mediator, then sends 
copy of his report to Larsen in attempt to get Larsen to "recon-
sider his opinion". (R. 536, T. 637.) 
4. Larsen pressures Tolman for copy of his report in 
order to support Larsen's position. 
5. Soon after it is prepared by Joan Binkard, a copy 
of Tolman's report goes to Murray Fire Department even though the 
original has not been approved by Harman. 
6. Larsen finds Tolman's report does not support 
Larsen's opinion as much as he wants because Tolman forms no 
opinion as to cause. 
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7. Larsen is told by Tolman that if Harman finds out 
the report was released prior to approval, Tolman could have 
trouble on the job. 
8. Fifteen months later, Larsen uses that as an excuse 
to lie in deposition about Tolman's report and avoid further 
diminuition of his investigation's credibility. 
9. Through independent sources, evidence begins to 
mount that perhaps Larsenfs opinion is wrong. 
10. In December, 1985, Larsen finds Tolman's report in 
Chief Coombs1 office after a 45 minute search following request 
from civil attorney Tom Green. 
There exists no evidence that, in August, 1983, Tolman 
knew or believed that Larsen was going to testify in an official 
proceeding. Moreover, there is no evidence that Tolman attempted 
to induce Larsen to withhold Tolman's report from an official 
/13 proceeding. Dean Larsen mistook his own self-interest for an 
act of friendship, willfully failed to testify about Tolman's 
report, which led to Tolman being accused of hiding the report. 
/14 The ultimate fact in this melodrama is that Larsen lied after 
Tolman told him not to. There were no crimes committed by Ralph 
Tolman. Even when the evidence is reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, the convictions simply cannot 
stand. State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Grand jury prosecutions in Utah have a long and doleful 
history. This matter should be reversed and ordered dismissed by 
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this court, or in the alternative remanded for new trial. 
DATED this /Cp day of March, 1988. 
LONI F. D e L A N D / 
Attorney for Appellant Tolman 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Appellant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of March, 1988, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and Edward K. Brass, 321 
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The crime of Tampering with Evidence was never proven as to 
either Defendant, nor were they convicted of such crime. 
2/ 
In fact, this Indictment was subsequently amended prior to 
trial (R. 178-185), but none of the fatal deficiencies previously 
evidenced were rehabilitated. Therefore, the proper remedy was 
dismissal prior to trial, or amendment sufficient to obviate the 
error. 
3/ 
At the least, the court should have ruled that although 
Tolman was arraigned on the charges, he was entitled at some 
point to a probable cause hearing in order to insure his rights 
to "demand the nature and cause of the accusations against him". 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution. 
4/ 
' Rev. St. 1933, 105-21-9, as amended by Laws 1935, c. 118, 
provided in pertinent part, "the court . . . shall at the request 
of the defendant, order the prosecuting attorney to furnish a 
bill of particulars . . . " [Emphasis added.] 
5/ 
"Evidence" which was primarily hearsay, highly inferential, 
and which purported to imply some criminal intent merely by its 
existence, rather than bv some rational or demonstrable nexus to 
any actus reus of a crime. 
On the issue of conspiracy, the following ruling was made: 
"Based on the testimony that has been given so far, the court is 
of the opinion that the evidence does show that there is some, 
either whether you call it cover-up or some evidence that would 
indicate that there is, on the part of the parties involved, an 
effort not to have the report that is the subject matter of this 
particular hearing [sic] not to be divulged publicly as far as 
the records of the county attorney is concerned." (R. 535, T. 
868.) 
7/ 
That segment reads: [with emphasis added] 
Mr. Keller: All right. 
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This investigation, Mr. Tolman, concerns your 
possible preparation of a report in August, 1983, 
which was supplemented by a second report some time 
later, involving a fire which occurred on May 1st, 
1983 at the Fashion Place Mall. Do you understand 
that's the subject of our inquiry at this time? 
A: Yes sir, I do, 
Q: All right. 
Mr. Snow: And that involves possible charges or allegations 
regarding tampering with evidence or suppressing 
evidence that should be part of an official 
proceeding. You understand that? 
The Witness: Yes, sir. 
8/ 
For Tolman to exercise his right to counsel after being sworn 
as a witness may have had an irreparably suggestive effect upon 
the grand jurors. Hypothetical outcomes not withstanding, it was 
a scenario which never should have occurred. 
9/ 
The evidence log (R. 346) does indicate those exhibits to 
have been "admitted". They were not, however, offered or re-
ceived as were Exhibits 33-44. (R. 530, T. 57-58.) 
' Assuming, arguendo, that 801 prohibits a witness from 
testifying as to what he/she said, but not what they are saying 
now 803 (24) provides an exception so long as circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness exist. The fact that a witness is 
under oath seems to insure that he/she will restate accurately 
that which he/she once stated while not under oath; thus making 
what was said then circumstantially trustworthy. 
11
' Provided at Addendum A-7 is RCW9A.72.120, as well as the two 
corollary statutes on witness interference. Each relates the 
proscribed act to the official proceeding pending, which 
§76-8-508 does not. 
12/ 
' Stated in hypothetical form, Bob (any person) knows his wife 
is contemplating filing for divorce (any official proceeding) and 
attempts to induce his neighbor, Bill (any other person), to 
withhold his garbage from trash collection (any thing). While 
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the requisite elements of the statute have been fulfilled, it 
seems that unless there is something in Bill's garbage that 
pertains to the divorce, there is no crime. 
' Dean Larsen was deposed twice, appeared before the grand 
jury, and testified at trial. Likewise, Tolman was twice 
deposed, gave grand jury testimony on two occasions and appeared 
at trial. Either directly through those two witnesses, or 
indirectly by hearsay through Harrington, Yearby, Ashby and 
Coombs, the following descriptive verbiage was attributed to 
Tolman's directions to Larsen regarding the report: "destroyed 
or burned or something" (R. 536, T. 492-593, 1. 20-25, 1-5), 
"destroy" (R. 536, T. 665, 1. 5-8), "shred the report" (R. 536, 
T. 666, 1. 8-13), "torn up" (R. 535, T. 869, 1. 17-18), "destroy 
it or tear it up" (R. 535, T. 869, 1. 20-21), "get rid of it, 
destroy it, whatever you have to do" (R. 535, T. 919, 1. 9-13), 
"merely wanted the fact that you had the report concealed from 
Mr. Harman" (R. 537, T. 960, 1. 18-21), "not disclose" (R. 537, 
T. 961, 1. 8-11), "not to physically get rid of that report but 
to conceal the fact it went to you from this man" (R. 537, T. 
1006-1007, 1. 23-25, 1-3), "get the report back or have it deep 
sixed" (R. 530, T. 19, 1.21-25), "eat it, put it on your walls" 
(R. 530, T. 36, 1. 11-23). Regardless of which of these terms 
was actually used, Tolman never attempted to induce Larsen to 
withhold the report from the official proceeding. In fact, the 
opposite is true, and Larsen claims never to have had physical 
control over the document at any time prior to Mr. Green's 
request to produce it. (R. 535; T. 914, T. 920, T. 924, T. 928, 
T. 935.) 
7
 He lied in his first deposition clearly. Upon 
cross-examination by Mr. Brass, he admitted to certain untruths 
in his second deposition. (R. 537, T. 969-972.) Then, at trial 
he contradicted himself twice alone on the single issue of 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO QUASH 
COUNT I 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, herein moves the court 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(77-35-12, Utah Code Annotated) to quash or otherwise dismiss 
Count I of the indictment in that it fails to adequately charge 
the offense of Criminal Conspiracy under Utah Code Annotated 
§76-4-201 (1953 as amended). 
FACTS 
Count I of the indictment alleges that Defendant Tolman 
committed Criminal Conspiracy by intending to commit the crime of 
Tampering with Evidence pursuant to an agreement to do so with 
co-defendant Harman. 
"A-l" 000082 
The factual allegations purport that the co-defendants 
entered into the said agreement on August 1, 1983, whereby they 
conspired to conceal Defendant Tolmanfs seven-page investigative 
report as to the origin and cause of a fire which established 
potential liability in Salt Lake County and further conspired to 
have Defendant Tolman prepare and submit a false one-page report 
which would omit the conclusion giving rise to the said liabil-
ity. 
ARGUMENT 
Count T is fatally defective in that it doer; not alleae 
facts sufficient to establish the elements necessary to charge 
Defendant with a crime for which he may be prosecuted. 
To persuade the court to allow further prosecution of 
Criminal Conspiracy, §76-4-201, Utah Code Annotated, the factual 
allegations must, on the face of the charging document, be 
sufficient, if proved, to actually constitute a violation of each 
element of the crime. 
Therefore, the facts must demonstrate: 
(1) An agreement between these co-defendants, entered 
into on August 1, 1983; 
(2) To engage in conduct constitution the crime of 
Tampering with Evidence in violation of §76-8-501; 
(3) While possessing the intent to commit the said 
crime (Tampering), and 
-2- 000083 
(4) Thereafter commit an overt act in furtherance of 
the said agreement. 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty 
of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct 
constituting a crime be performed, agrees 
with one or more persons to engage in or 
cause the performance of such conduct and any 
one of them commits an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy. 
76-4-201. 
The element of "engaging in conduct" requires factual 
allegations sufficient to show that the mutual intent of the 
conspirators was to successfully satisfy each element of the 
underlying offense. 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree, if believing that an official pro-
ceeding or investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity 
or availability in the proceeding or inves-
tigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
§76-8-501. 
Since the State pleads the underlying offense in the 
disjunctive, either of which constitutes the crime of Tampering, 
it should be presumed that the agreement is alleged to have 
encompassed both the destruction or concealment of the seven-page 
report (76-8-501(1)) as well as the presentment of the substitute 
false one-page report (76-8-501(2)) several weeks later. 
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A. No Agreement is Factually Alleged. 
The primary element of Conspiracy, i.e., an agreement 
to commit a crime, is not alleged. An "agreement" implies a 
meeting of the minds, privity of intent or some such factual 
pleading to charge that a mutuality of common design was reached. 
However, the State's own pleading at page 2, paragraphs 
(a) and (b) provide the only facts of any such agreement; howev-
er, the facts only allege that Defendant Harman "rejected" 
Defendant Tolman's seven-page report and ordered him as a superi-
or to a subordinate, to prepare another (the one-page) report. 
The State's facts may show Defendant Tolman 
acquiescence to the orders of a superior but do not allege an 
agreement to jointly conceal or destroy the first report. 
Further, every agreement at law requires express or 
implied acceptance to be bound thereby. Defendant Tolman's 
acquiescence is not alleged to occur until August 25, upon 
submission of the second report. 
B. Elements Constituting "Tampering" Under Either 
Alternative, Have not been Alleged vis-a-vis the Conspiracy 
Elements. 
1. If Defendants conspired to violate Section (1) of 
the Tampering statute, i„e., to alter, conceal, destroy or remove 
something to impair its verity or availability, such acts could 
only apply to a then-existing "something" viz., the seven-page 
report. 
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However, the State alleges no after occurring overt 
acts in violation of the charge. Overt acts (a) and (b) of Count 
I do not occur in furtherance of the agreement but, in fact are 
the acts of Harman which the State claims are the agreement from 
Harman's position, Tolman's acquiescence to Harman's orders, 
thereby satisfying the State's curious definition of "agreement11 
was not an overt act but merely the finalization of the pact. 
Therefore, the only act that could be construed as one in fur-
therance of the conspiracy would be Harman's approval of the 
second report. 
Therefore, there are no overt acts in furtherance of 
the agreement to conceal the first report alleged. The opposite 
is alleged, i.e., inaction. 
Further there is no allegation that the seven-page 
report was altered, concealed, destroyed, etc. There is no 
allegation even referring to said report after its rejection by 
Harman. 
2. As to the second alternative "tampering" violation, 
the State has utterly failed to allege one key element and cannot 
demonstrate another, i.e., falsity. 
Clearly this charge can only refer to the one-page 
report. Nowhere in the pleading has the State identified who the 
public servant is who Defendants intended to deceive by the 
second report. According to the State's information, all the 
deception concerning the juggling of reports was done tr£ the 
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public servants, not to them. It was the private plaintiffs in 
the civil action attendant the fire who were deceived. 
Tf it is assumed that an agreement was entered at some 
point between August 1 and August 31, 1983, there is still no 
basis to charge conspiracy upon the overt acts (c) and (d). 
Neither of those alleged acts demonstrates that Defendants 
intended conduct constituting a crime pursuant to that agreement 
be performed. The conduct does not demonstrate pursuit of 
76-8-501(1) for the reason that nothing was altered, destroyed, 
concealed or removed. Nor does it show intent to violate 
76-8-501(2) for the simple reason that the one-page report was 
not alleged to have been known to be false. 
In summary, the allegations as set forth in Count I 
establish no basis for a belief as to unity of design or purpose 
or concert of will of Defendants so as to demonstrate an agree-
ment. Moreover, even if an agreement is presumed, there are no 
overt acts established in furtherance of such agreement. The 
State has also failed to establish Defendant Tolman's intent to 
violate 76-8-501(1) or (2) and have not alleged facts to show 
the elements thereof were the same conduct to which Defendants1 
acts were designed to violate. Therefore, Count I is defective 
on its face and should be dismissed. 
DATED this ^ / day of January, 1987. 
LONI F. D e L A N D ' ( 
Attorney for Defendant Toliran 
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?T W. REED* 
Attorney for Defendant: Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^( day of January, 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry R. Keller, #8 East 
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
V. ) EXAMINATION 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and ) Case No. CR 86-1522 
RALPH TOLMAN, ) 
Defendants. ) 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue raised by this motion is whether Defendant, 
having been charged by grand jury indictment, is entitled to 
receive a preliminary hearing upon the charges contained therein. 
It is Defendant's position that, indeed, he is afforded the right 
to preliminary examination in this case and denial of that right 
would violate Utah State constitutional provision as delineated 





I. THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY HEARING IS A 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT IN UTAH 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that while a 
state is not required to provide preliminary hearing as a federal 
constitutional right, such hearings where granted under state law 
fall within the purview of Sixth Amendment rights. Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed. 387 (1970). Using 
"critical stage" analysis, that court found the preliminary 
hearing was an important procedure in allowing defendant 
opportunity to answer and defend against criminal charges, and 
that counsel was essential to protect the accused against 
improvident prosecution. 
The Utah Constitution provides specific protections to 
persons charged with crimes. Under Article I, §12 a person has 
the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him" [emphasis added]. Article I, §7 states that "no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law". These provisions as read together guarantee 
that all criminal defendants be accorded certain substantial 
rights before being convicted of a crime, including the right to 
preliminary hearing. State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (1980). 
Utah has long held the right to preliminary examination 
to be a substantial right. State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 146 P. 300 
(1915); State v. Overson, 55 U. 230, 185 P. 364 (1919). It is a 
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right which cannot be waived except by the Defendant, and once 
waived is absolute and not generally subject to review. State v. 
Freeman, 93 U. 125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937); State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026 (1982). 
II. PRELIMINARY HEARING SHOULD NOT BE 
PRECLUDED BY INDICTMENT 
The threshold question to be addressed is whether an 
indictment absolutely precludes the right to preliminary hearing. 
An overview of federal and sister state jurisdiction indicates 
the contrary and that the procedural mechanisms employed deter-
mine the necessity of such hearing. Moreover, some jurisdictions 
hold that the rights of the accused are so fundamental that no 
procedural avenues may be obviated. 
A. Federal System 
The right to preliminary hearing in the federal crimi-
nal justice is contained in Title 18 U.S.C. §3060 and Rule 5(c) 
Rule 7 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (77-35-7 Utah Code 
Ann., as amended) further indicates the consent of the prosecut-
ing attorney is likewise required before a magistrate may bind 
the defendant over to district court for trial. 
OOQQ1 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Under the rule, a 
defendant who answers to a criminal complaint is entitled to 
preliminary hearing unless, between the filing of the complaint 
and the time set for preliminary hearing, an intervening 
indictment is returned. Several federal circuit courts have held 
that return of an indictment renders the statutory right to 
preliminary hearing moot. See Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 
(2nd Cir. 1967) . 
The pertinent portion of Rule 5(c) provides: 
A defendant is entitled to a preliminary 
examination, unless waived, when charged with 
any offense, other than a petty offense, 
which is to be tried by a judge of the 
district court. If the defendant waives 
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall 
forthwith hold him to answer in the district 
court. If the defendant does not waive the 
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall 
schedule a preliminary examination. Such 
examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time but in any event not later than 10 days 
following the initial appearance if the 
defendant is in custody and no later than 20 
days if he is not in custody, provided, 
however, that the preliminary examination 
shall not be held if the defendant is indict-
ed or if an information against the defendant 
is filed in district court before the date 
set for the preliminary examination. 
oooc:a 
It is most important to note two things regarding the 
federal procedure: (1) Grand jury indictment is the general 
3 
rule rather than the exception in the federal system, and 
(2) the statute and the corresponding procedural rule on 
preliminary hearing contemplate indictment after the initial 
appearance before the magistrate. Because the federal courts 
rely primarily upon indictment rather than information, the 
corresponding federal procedures can be distinguished from Utah 
proceedings on that basis alone. 
The federal system has not developed in the absence of 
some commentary about the desirability of requiring preliminary 
hearingf as demonstrated by the following analysis presented to 
the Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (1966). 
[T]he purpose of a commissioner's hearing is 
not only to have another determination of 
whether there is probable cause, but to do so 
in an adversary proceeding. This is why a 
defendant is given the right to 
cross-examine, to call witnesses and to 
testify in his own behalf. * * * There is no 
reason to assume that the adversary system is 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates 
grand jury presentment or indictment in order to commence action 
upon infamous or capital crimes. Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure indicates that all felonies must be prosecuted 
by indictment, unless the defendant waives that right in open 
court. 
oooo/o 
less suitable for finding the truth before 
trial when the standard of proof is probable 
cause than it is at trial when the standard 
is beyond a reasonable doubt, * * * We 
should not forget that we are dealing with 
people and public institutions. I think that 
fundamental fairness requires that a citizen 
who has been deprived of his liberty have an 
opportunity to determine the charge against 
him from a judicial officer and to confront 
either his accuser or the police in a judi-
cial setting as soon as it is feasible to 
provide the opportunity. * * * 
Hearings on U.S. Commissioner System, at 270-71. 
Similarly, the A.L.I. Model Pre-Arraignment Code, 
§§330-340 (1975) proposes that substantial rights of the defen-
dant are better satisfied by preliminary hearing than by grand 
jury proceeding. The Code provides that: 
(1) a preliminary hearing automatically 
shall be scheduled in each case; (2) the 
defendant shall be deemed to have waived 
indictment by electing to utilize the hear-
ing; and (3) issuance of a prior indictment 
"shall not terminate [defendant's] right to a 
preliminary hearing. 
The rationale of such a rule is based upon policy 
considerations that a grand jury indictment is not an adequate or 
fair substitute for a preliminary hearing. 
It is clear that while F.R.Cr.P. 5(c) is similar in 
content to Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
77-35-7(c) Utah Code Annotated (as amended), the procedural 
context within which those rules are employed are as different as 
apples and oranges. Therefore, the prevailing federal system 
imposes no prohibitive effect upon Utah law. 
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B. Indictment States 
Many states have taken the federal courts lead in 
requiring grand jury indictment for prosecution of felony mat-
ters. Likewise, the process of preliminary hearing is provided 
for, but may be mooted by return of indictment prior to hearing. 
The primary reliance upon the indictment process 
distinguishes these states from Utah. It is interesting to note, 
however, that at least two states allow the defendant to request 
a preliminary hearing and an indictment in felony matters. See 
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 230 Pa. Super. 89, 326 A.2d 598 
(Pennsylvania, 1974); Moore v. State, 578 S.W.2d 78 (Tennessee, 
1979). Again, this recognition supports the contention that a 
preliminary hearing in open court is an essential element of any 
criminal proceeding, regardless of the nature of its commence-
ment . 
C. Information States 
Utah is among approximately thirty state jurisdictions 
in which criminal proceedings may commence by indictment or 
information. See Rule 5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1980, 
As of 1979, the total number of "indictment states" was 
twenty, with five additional states requiring indictment in 
capital cases. Utah is not among these jurisdictions. 
as amended). The heavy use of the information alternative serves 
to characterize these states as "information states". 
Many of these states have not ruled on the propriety of 
pre-arrest indictment vis-a-vis the right to preliminary hearing. 
Three states, however, have rejected the view that a grand jury 
indictment eliminates the need for a preliminary hearing. Stone 
v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616 (Oklahoma Cr. App. 1971); People v. Duncan, 
388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (Michigan, 1972); Hawkins v. 
Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916 
(California, 1978) . The Hawkins court based its decision upon 
state constitutional grounds of equal protection, grounds which 
had previously been rejected in California. The court further 
referred to Coleman v. Alabama, supra in noting the value to 
defendant of a preliminary hearing. The court also observed: 
The grand jury is independent only in the 
sense that it is not formally attached to the 
prosecutor's office; though legally free to 
vote as they please, grand jurors virtually 
always assent to the recommendations of the 
prosecuting attorney, a fact borne out by 
available statistical and survey data. * * * 
The pervasive prosecutorial influence re-
flected in such statistics has led an impres-
sive array of commentators to endorse the 
sentiment expressed by United States District 
Judge William Campbell, a former prosecutor: 
"Today, the grand jury is the total captive 
of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will 
A minority of these states allow "direct filing", which may 
circumvent any right to preliminary hearing. Certain special 
requirements attach in these jurisdictions to insure that the 
information is supported by probable cause. Utah observes no 
such procedure. 
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concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for 
almost anything before any grand jury." 
586 P.2d at 919. 
Particularly in an "information state" such as Utah, 
the procedural safeguards otherwise provided by preliminary 
hearing are not satisfied by rusty machinery of a seldom-used 
grand jury system, and therefore, should not preclude defendants' 
substantial right to such hearing. 
III. UTAH LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT PRELIMINARY 
HEARING IN THE INSTANT CASE 
At first blush, the strongest argument against Defen-
dant's contention appears to be a recitation of the last sentence 
in Rule 7(c), U.R.Cr.P. which simply states "A preliminary 
examination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted." 
Close scrutiny of this statement within the procedural context of 
7(c), coupled with the provisions of Article I, §13 of the Utah 
Constitution, reveals such simplistic reasoning as clearly 
fallacious. 
Initially, it is indisputable that Utah's Rule 7(c) 
reads essentially the same as paragraph two of Federal Rule 5(c), 
supra. In fact, the only substantial difference between the two 
is that the extension provision and the proscription of prelimi-
nary hearing are juxtaposed. Unfortunately, Utah's aforemen-
tioned proscription clause is silent as to whether its applica-
tion is contingent, as is the federal rule, upon the return of an 
indictment after initial appearance but before the date set for 
GOOO:'4 
preliminary hearing" The plain meaning of the statute read as a 
whole supports the conclusion that the intention was to mirror 
the federal rule. 
Absent any legislative directive to the contrary, the 
statute cannot be construed to prohibit preliminary hearing 
absolutely, since this would contravene the specific provisions 
of Article I, §13, which provides: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by infor-
mation after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused with the consent of the State, 
or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legis-
lature. [Emphasis added]. 
The constitutional provision allows for preliminary 
examination in cases brought by indictment. That guarantee may 
not be tacitly denied merely on the basis of an ambiguous legis-
lative enactment. 
It is for the reasons stated above that Defendant is 
entitled to, and therefore respectfully requests preliminary 
hearing on the matters presently situated before this Court. 
The legislative record is similarly mute as to the legislative 
intent to be attached to this provision. C. 1953, 77-35-7, 
enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, §1. 
OOQO 
DATED this 3 / day of/octobe 
LONI F. IbeLAND" 
Attorney for Defendant/Tolman 
?T W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant"Tolman 
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McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants, 
MOTION FOR A BILL OF 
PARTICULARS 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, by and through his attorneys, 
Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, moves the court pursuant to 
Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 77-35-4 (amended 
1980) , to order the production of a statement of particular 
factual information regarding the following: 
1. With regard to Count I and Count II: 
a. State the exact date, time, location and general 
nature of the agreement constituting the conspiracy as charged in 
Count I. 
b. State the intended conduct constituting a crime and 
by whom the conduct was performed. 
"A-3 000064 
c. Describe the nature of the official proceeding or 
investigation pending or about to be instigated. 
d. State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-
dant Tolman believed such proceeding or investigation as de-
scribed above was pending or about to be instigated. 
e. State the specific manner in which Defendant Tolman 
is alleged to have altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed the 
investigative report. 
f. Specify what presentation or use of a false report 
was made by Defendant Tolman for the purpose of deceiving a 
public servant or servants, and specify which public servant(s). 
2. With regard to Count IV: 
a. State the specific acts alleged to have been 
committed by Defendant Tolman to induce or cause C. Dean Larsen 
to withhold testimony, information documents or things. 
b. Specify which element of testimony, information, 
document or thing was alleged to have been the subject of such 
inducement or cause, beside the seven page report. 
c. State whether said report was in fact withheld by 
C. Dean Larsen. 
d. State the date, time, location and general nature 
of acts alleged. 
e. Describe the nature of the official proceeding or 
investigation which was pending or about to be instituted. 
2- 000065 
f. State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-
dant Tolman believed that such proceeding or investigation as 
described above was pending or about to be instituted. 
3. With regard to Count V: 
a. State the specific nature of the benefit or harm 
intended by Defendant Tolman. 
b. State the specific acts which Defendant Tolman 
performed or failed to perform. 
c. State the specific basis upon which it is alleged 
that the acts or omissions performed by Defendant Tolman were 
knowingly performed. 
DATED this I day of December, 1986. 
LONI F. D e L A N D ' 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
-T&P 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / day of December, 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry R. Keller, #8 East 
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, PWTE Of UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DONALD CLAUDE HAPMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. ] 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPORT 
I OF MOTION FOR BILL 
1 OF PARTICULARS 
i Case No. CR-86-1522 
1 Judge Raymond Uno 
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, moves the court to grant 
motion pursuant to Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
77-35-4(3) Utah Code Annotated (amended 1980) for further factual 
information so as to adequately inform Defendant of the nature 
and cause of the offenses charged. 
ARGUMENT 
Each of the crimes which Defendant Tolman is charged 
with require that Defendant has certain prior knowledge or 
information or that he acts with some specific intention. 
Additionally, each of the statutes charged rely on alternative 
elements for their proof. 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sa'.t Lake Ccunty. Utah 
. . ' I ! 2 2 1937 
G00G89 
The Defendant is entitled to know the specific nature 
of the acts alleged to fulfill the elemental requirements of each 
statute, short of a demonstration of actual evidence to be used. 
State v. Moraine, 25 U.2d 51, 475 P.2d 831 (1970); State v. 
Mitchell, 57] P.2d 1351 (1977). 
DATED this day of January, 19 87. 
L0NIF7 DeLAND { 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREPY CERTIFY that on the ^Qf day of January, 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry P. Keller, #8 East 
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
£)Ub?u "yy/^h^a^A/i,^-
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 




Case No. CR 86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
FACTS 
On April 9, 1986, Ralph R. Tolman appeared before the 
Salt Lake County Grand Jury pursuant to a subpoena issued by 
authority of that body. At no time prior to his appearance was 
he informed that he was a subject or "target" of the Grand Jury 
investigation. 
As Tolman was being brought before the Grand Jury for 
testimony, he was instructed orally by Special Prosecutor Larry 
Keller that he was a "target". When Tolman stated that he no 
longer wished to remain to testify, Keller then stated that 
000188 
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Tolman must stay pursuant to the subpoena, as well as the docu-
ments Tolman had brought. 
On the record before the Grand Jury, it was "suggested" 
that Tolman was a subject of the investigation and that he had a 
right to have counsel "present" outside the Grand Jury room. 
(Tolman testimony, April 9, 1986, p.2.) At no point was Tolman 
informed of the potential charges against him. 
It should be noted that at least two other potential 
subjects of the Grand Jury investigation received letters so 
informing them in advance of their appearance before the Grand 
Jury. (Harman testimony, April 17, 1986, p.5; Dawson testimony, 
April 15, 1986, p.2.) 
ARGUMENT 
With regard to the appearance and testimony before the 
Grand Jury of an investigation subject or "target", the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that such person is more than just a 
witness, but an accused within the meaning of Article I, Section 
Twelve of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ruggeri, 19 U.2d 216, 
429 P.2d 969 (1967). In that case, a county commissioner named 
Brady was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury but not informed that 
he was a target of the investigation. Based upon his testimony, 
Brady was subsequently prosecuted for perjury. Prior to trial, 
the district court judge (Ruggeri) granted a motion to suppress 
the use of said testimony as evidence. 
-2 
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The plaintiff filed a proceeding before the Supreme 
Court for a writ to compel Ruggeri to reverse his decision, which 
the Supreme Court declined to do. The court also ruled that: 
". . . one being investigated for crime is 
not just a witness and cannot be treated as 
such. The target of an investigation is an 
accused within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and when he is detained in any signifi-
cant way, he may not be interrogated unless 
he is advised of the charges against him then 
under consideration. To fail to so warn one 
so being investigated is to entrap him and to 
violate his constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination." 
429 P.2d at 973. [Emphasis added.1 
The court further observed that the violation occurs notwith-
standing any assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the 
immunity is complete. 
The court concludes its observation as follows: 
"It would seem that a witness who is unaware 
that he is a target of a grand jury inves-
tigation could not intelligently determine 
whether or not he needed counsel unless he 
was fully advised of the charges being 
considered against him; and until he has full 
knowledge regarding this matter, he will not 
know when to assert his constitutional claim 
of privilege against self-incrimination. It 
would also be difficult to believe that he 
could intelligently waive the right to 
counsel under such circumstances." 
429 P.2d at 975. 
It is clear that Tolman had no notice of his target 
status prior to appearance at the Grand Jury. Once at the Grand 
Jury, his appearance was "custodial" requiring complete Miranda 
admonition. As in Ruggeri, it is difficult to believe Tolman 
000190 
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could be fully apprised of his rights unless he had known and had 
the opportunity to share with counsel his status as a subject. 
For that reason alone the indictment should be quashed 
or the testimony suppressed as evidence against either Defendant. 
DATED this /3 day of February, 1987. 
^LONl F. D e L A N D ' 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the |3 day of February, 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered 
to Larry R. Keller, Judge Building, #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 77 West 200 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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RODNEY G. SNOW (3028) 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
LARRY R. KELLER (1785) 
#8 East Broadway 
Judge Building, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY
 r STATE <:]• 7AH 






Case No, CLK /g- /s>t x. 
I N D I C T M E N T 
VIO. U.C.A. § 76-4-201 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-508 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-510 
(TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-201 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT) 
^ 
THE 1986 SPECIAL SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY CHARGES: 
COUNT I 
\ 0 ' ^ (CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY) 
Beginning from on or about August 1, 1983 through on or about 
August 31, L98I, in SdIt Lake County, intending that conduct consti-
tuting a crime be performed, and believing that an official proceeding 
"A-5' Q00OT2 
or investigation was pending or about to be instigated, Defendants 
Donald Claude Harraan and Ralph Tolraanf then investigators of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office, conspired, combined, confederated and 
agreed with each other to conceal or remove a report, to impair the 
report's verity or availability, or to make, present or use a false 
report to deceive a public servant or servants, said reports having 
been prepared by Defendant Tolman regarding the origin of a fire that 
occurred on or about May 1, 1983 at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza, Salt Lake County, that involved the destruction of County and 
private property. 
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects 
thereof, the following overt acts were committed: 
(a) On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman, the then 
Chief Investigator of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office, 
rejected Defendant Tolman1s August 1, 1983, seven-page report 
about the origin of the Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire; 
(b) On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman issued 
instructions to Defendant Tolman to write a brief or one-page 
report closing his investigation into the origin of the Fashion 
Place Professional Plaza fire; 
(c) On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Tolman submitted 
to Defendant Harman a one-page report which eliminated any refer-
ence to Defendant Tolman's opinion as to the origin of the fire; 
(d) On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Harraan accepted 
and approved Defendant Tolman's report of August 25, 1983 as 
-2-
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Defendant Tolman's official report regarding his investigation 
the F a s h i o n PI a t. t,ji P rote s s i o n a I PI a 2 d f i r e ; 





J^u . • . . (TA MPERING WITH EVIDENCE) 
I That during the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believ-
ing that an official proceeding or investigation wan pending 01 about, 
to be instituted, Defendants Donald Claude Harman and Ralph Tolman did 
alter, destroy, conceal, < remove Ralph Tolman's investigative report 
of August 1, ] 983, with t htj pui-pose 10 1 mpci ;: verity or avail-
ability in an official proceeding or investigation which was then 
pending or about to be instituted; all in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-5.1 - 'iiy of the Second Degree. 
COUNT III 
On ^  (TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS - DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN) 
That during the month of August 1983, In Salt Lake County, believ-
ing that dii ol!' ic 1 a,i proceeding << 1 lovesti gat ion was pending or about 
to be instituted, Defendant Donald Claude Harman did attempt to induce 
or otherwise cause Defendant Ralph Tolman to withhold testimony, mfor-
mat i on, document, or thing, to wit: Ralph Tolman's seven-page 
investigative report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 1983 
Fashion Place Professional Plaz<:t f111 e
 p ill in violation ot; Utah Code 





(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS - RALPH TOLMAN) 
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to 
be instituted, Defendant Ralph Tolman did attempt to induce or other-
wise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold testimony, information, docu-
ment, or thing, in that Defendant Tolman requested C. Dean Larsen to 
destroy or dispose of Defendant Tolman's seven-page investigative 
report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 1983 Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire; all in violation of Utah Code Ann* 
S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree. 
COUNT V 
sr>V (OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT - UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY) 
fVV 
T i During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, Defendants 
Ralph Tolman and Donald Claude Harman, then investigators for the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office and public servants, with the intent to 
benefit themselves or another, or to harm another, knowingly committed 
unauthorized acts which purported to be acts of their office, or know-
ingly refrained from performing a duty imposed upon them by law or 
clearly inherent in the nature of their office, in that said Defen-
dants altered, destroyed, concealed or removed Ralph Tolman1s 
seven-page investigative report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 
1983 Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose to impair 
its verity or availability in an official proceeding or investigation 
-4- GOOD' 
which was pending or about to be instituted; H 1.1 in violation <>1 utan 
Code Ann. § 76-8-20 1, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 1986. 
ru&y J©HNSON 
Foreperson, Salt Lake County Special 
Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN > before me !•... f^dd-. October, 1986 
My Commission Expires: 
^rcvc^s-^ 
NOTARY PUBLICv 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
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RODNEY G. SNOW (3028) 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
LARRY R. KELLER (1785) 
#8 East Broadway 
Judge Building, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaint if r', 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants, 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
AMENDED INDICTMENT 
VIO. U.C.A. SS 76-4-201, 76-8-510 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, CONSPIRACY 
TO TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-510 
(TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-508 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-201 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT) 
THE 1986 SPECIAL SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY CHARGES: 
COUNT I 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, CONSPIRACY TO TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE) 
Beginning from on oi about August 1, 1983 through on or about 
August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, intending that conduct consti-
tuting a crime be performed, and believing that an nffiriai proceeding 
"A-6" 00019
s 
or investigation was pending or about to be instituted, Defendants 
Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman, then investigators of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office, conspired, combined, confederated and 
agreed with each other to alter, destroy, conceal or remove a report, 
with a purpose to impair the report's verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation, or to make, present or use a report, 
which Defendants knew to be false, with a purpose to deceive a public 
servant or servants who were or may have been engaged in an official 
proceeding or investigation, said reports having been prepared by 
Defendant Tolman regarding the origin of a fire that occurred on or 
about May 1, 1983 at the Fashion Place Professional Plaza, Salt Lake 
County, that involved the destruction of County and private property. 
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects 
thereof, the following overt acts were committed: 
(a) On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman, the then 
Chief Investigator of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office, 
rejected Defendant Tolman's August 1, 1983, seven-page report 
about the origin of the Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire; 
(b) On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman issued 
instructions to Defendant Tolman to write a brief or one-page 
report closing his investigation into the origin of the Fashion 
Place Professional Plaza fire; 
(c) On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Tolman submitted 
to Defendant Harman a one-page report which eliminated any refer-
ence to Defendant Tolman's opinion as to the origin of the fire; 
-2- 000196 
(d) On ot about August 25, 1.983, Detendant: Harman accepted 
and approved Defendant Tolman's report of August 25, 1983 as 
Defendant Tolman's official report regarding his investigation of 
the Fashi oi i PJ ace Professional Plaza fire; 
all in violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-201 and 76-8-510, a felony 
of the Third Degree. 
COUNT II 
(TAMPERING WITH .EVIDENCE) 
That during the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believ-
ing that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about 
ro tie instituted, Defendants Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman did 
alter, destroy, conceal, •, remove Ralph Tolman's investigative report 
of August i, 19P3, with c;pose """.u impair it verity or availability 
in an official proceeding investigation; all in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-510, a felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT III 
(TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS • CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN) 
That during the month of August 1983/ in Salt Lake County, believ-
ing that an official proceeding or investigation was pendinq oi abuut 
to be instituted/ Defendant Claude Donald Harman did attempt to induce 
or otherwise cause Defendant Ralph Tolman to withhold testimony/ infor-
mation/ document,. thingr to wit: Ralph Tolman's seven-page 
investigative lepoti, ot August 1 , ] 983 regarding the May lr 198 3 
oooia7 
fashion Place Professional Plaza fire; all in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree. 
COUNT IV 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS - RALPH TOLMAN) 
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to 
be instituted, Defendant Ralph Tolman did attempt to induce or other-
wise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold testimony, information, docu-
ment, or thing, in that Defendant Tolman requested C. Dean Larsen to 
destroy or dispose of Defendant Tolman1s seven-page investigative 
report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 1983 Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire; all in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree. 
COUNT V 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT - UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY) 
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, Defendants 
Ralph Tolman and Claude Donald Harman, then investigators for the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office and public servants, with the intent to 
benefit themselves or another, or to harm another, knowingly committed 
unauthorized acts which purported to be acts of their office, or know-
ingly refrained from performing a duty imposed upon them by law or 
clearly inherent in the nature of their office, in that said Defen-
dants altered, destroyed, concealed or removed Ralph Tolman1s 
.4. 000198 
seven-page investigative report of August lf 1983 regarding the May lf 
1983 Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose: to impair 
its verity 01 ,*v*ai i at)i 1 i ty in dn official proceeding or investigation 
which was pending or about to be instituted; all in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-8-201, a class B Misdemeanor. 
DATED thiy 9th day of October, 1986. 
JUDY JOHNSON 
Foreperson, Salt Lake County Special 
Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day * - - 6. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 






















Donald Claude Harman 
Walter R. "Bud" Ellett 









A. Evan Stephens 
Glen Bammerlin 
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9A.72.070 WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE 
Jury instructions. Perjury, first decree, definition, sec 
False swearing, definition, see Wash. Wash.Prac. vol. II, WPIC 118 01 
Prac vol. 11, WPIC 118.10. Perjury, second degree, definition 
Oath, definition, see Wash.Prac. vol. sec Wash.Prac. vol 11 W P I P I I O ' 
11. WPIC 118.15.
 0 5 ' ""
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9A.72.080. Statement of what one does not know to be true 
Every unqualified statement of that which one does not know to 
be true is equivalent to a statement of that which he knows to be 
false. 
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.72.080. 
Historical Note 
S o u r c e ;
 RRS §§ 2356 to 2358. 
Code 1881, §§ 872, 873. Former §§ 9.72.060 to 9.72.080 
Laws 1909, ch. 249, §§ 104 to 106. Laws 1957, ch. 46, § 2. 
Library References 
Perjury <£=12. does not know to be true, see Wash. 
C.J.S. Perjury § 6 et seq.
 P r a c > v o j u w p I C , 1 8 2 , 
Jury instructions, perjury or false 
swearing, statement of what one 
9A.72.085. Matters in official proceeding required to be sup-
ported, etc., by sworn statement, etc., may be 
supported, etc., by unsworn written statement, 
etc—Requirements of unsworn statement, form 
Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, order, 
or requirement made under the law of this state, any matter in an 
official proceeding is required or permitted to be supported, evi-
denced, established, or proved by a person's sworn written state-
ment, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, the 
matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, 
established, or proved in the official proceeding by an unsworn 
written statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, which: 
(1) Recites that it is certified or declared by the person to be true 
under penalty of perjury; 
(2) Is subscribed by the person; 
(3) States the date and place of its execution; and 
(4) States that it is so certified or declared under the laws of the 
state of Washington. 




"I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury under the laws of 
the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct": 
(Date and Place) (Signature) 
This section does not apply to writings requiring an acknowledge-
ment, depositions, oaths of office, or oaths required to be taken 
before a special official other than a notary public. 
Enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 187, § 3. 
Library References 
Civil practice, 
Attachment, affidavit, see Wash. 
Prac. vol. 15, Orland and Tegland. 
§ 503. 
Cost and attorney's fees, cost bill, 
see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and 
Tegland, § 451. 
Executions, adverse claims, summa-
ry procedure, see Wash.Prac. vol. 
15. Orland and Tegland, § 488. 
Executions, affidavit of judgment 
creditor, see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, 
Orland and Tegland, § 472. 
Executions, notice requirements, see 
Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and 
Tegland, § 482. 
Executions, redemption generally, 
redemption by judgment debtor, 
see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and 
Tegland, § 495. 
Executions, stay of execution, see 
Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and 
Tegland, § 483. 
Garnishment, application for writ, 
affidavit, sec Wash.Prac. vol. 15, 
Orland and Tegland, § 525. 
Garnishment, intervention by ad-
verse claimants, see Wash.Prac. 
vol. 15, Orland and Tegland, 
§ 542. 
Garnishment, quashing the writ 
when improperly issued, see 
Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and 
Tegland, § 532. 
Garnishment, termination of gar-
nishment, see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, 
Orland and Tegland, § 539. 
Garnishment, when answer is dis-
puted, see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Or-
land and Tegland, § 537. 
General contempt statute, see Wash. 
Prac. vol. 15, Orland and Tegland, 
§ 633. 
Replevin, procedure, see Wash.Prac. 
vol. 15, Orland and Tegland, 
§ 552. 
Criminal practice, criminal jurisdic-
tion and venue in general, see Wash. 
Prac. vol. 12, Ferguson. § 1601. 
I 
'9A.72.090. Bribing a witness 
(1) A person is guilty of bribing a witness if he offers, confers, or 
agrees to confer any benefit upon a witness or a person he has 
reason to believe is about to be called as a witness in any official 
proceeding or upon a person whom he has reason to believe may 
have information relevant to a criminal investigation, with intent 
to: 
(a) Influence the testimony of that person; or 
(b) Induce that person to avoid legal process summoning him to 
testify; or 
(c) Induce that person to absent himself from an official proceed-
ing to which he has been legally summoned. 
401 
9A.72.090 WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE 
(2) Bribing a witness is a class B felony. 
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260. § 9A.72.090. Amended by 
Laws 1982. 1st Ex.Sess.. ch. 47, § 16. 
Historical Note 
Laws 1982 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 16 Source: 
inserted "or upon a person whom he has Laws 1854, p. 89, § 71. 
reason to believe may have information ' Laws 1859, p. 118, § 71. 
relevant to a criminal investigation," in Laws 1869, p. 216, § 77. 
subsec. 1. Laws 1873, p. 199, § 81. 
Code 1881, § 877. 
Severability—Laws 1982. 1st Ex. Laws 1909, ch. 249, § 71. 
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note follow- RRS § 2323. 
ing § 9.41.190. Former § 9.18.040. 
Cross References 
Bribery and corrupt influence, see ch. 9A.68. 
Witness asking or receiving bribe, see § 9A.72.100. 
Library References 
Bribery <3^1(1). 
C.J.S. Bribery § 1 et seq. 
Notes of Decisions 
1. Jurisdiction of subject proceeding duce prosecution witness to leave state 
Where justice court was without juris- did not charge crime. Armstrong v. Van 
diction in prosecution, indictment that De Vanter (1899) 21 Wash. 682, 59 P. 
charged conspiracy with another to in- 510. 
9A,72«100. Bribe receiving by a witness 
(1) A witness or a person who has reason to believe he is about to 
be called as a witness in any official proceeding or that he may have 
information relevant to a criminal investigation is guilty of bribe 
receiving by a witness if he requests, accepts, or agrees to accept 
any benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that: 
(a) His testimony will thereby be influenced; or 
(b) He will attempt to avoid legal process summoning him to 
testify; or 
(c) He will attempt to absent himself from an official proceeding 
to which he has been legally summoned. 
(2) Bribe receiving by a witness is a class B felony. 
Enacted by Laws 1975. 1st Ex.Sess.. ch. 260. § 9A.72.100. Amended by 
Laws 1982. 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47. § 17. 
Historical Note 
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 17, have information relevant to a criminal 
in subsec. (1), inserted "or that he may investigation". 
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Severability—Law* 1982, 1st Ex. RRS § 2324. 
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note follow- Former § 9.18.050. 
ing § 9.41.190. 
Source: 
Laws 1909. ch. 249. § 72. 
Cross References 
Bribery of witness, see § 9A.72.090. 
Bribery s^Kl) . 
CJ.S. Bribery § 1 et seq. 
Library References 
Notes of Decisions 
1. Witness of violating former statute; since by for-
, _ . . . « J mer statute affidavit was made distinct 
One who for consideration offered to
 m e a n s f o r bringing testimony of witness-
make affidavit to be used on motion for
 e s ^ f o r e court on motions for new trial, 
new trial, stating that his former testi-
 a n d o r i e who testified by affidavit was 
mony in case was fabrication, was "wit- witness. State v. Dooley (1914) 82 
ness" within meaning of, and was guilty Wash. 483, 144 P. 654. 
9A.72.110. Intimidating a witness 
(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a witness if a person directs 
a threat to a former witness because of the witness' testimony in 
any official proceeding, or if, by use of a threat directed to a 
current witness or a person he has reason to belk;ve is about to be 
called as a witness in any official proceeding or to a person whom 
he has reason to believe may have information relevant to a 
criminal investigation, he attempts to: 
(a) Influence the testimony of that person; or 
(b) Induce that person to elude legal process summoning him to 
testify; or 
(c) Induce that person to absent himself from such proceedings. 
(2) 'Threat" as used in this section means 
(a) to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately 
to use force against any person who is present at the time; or 
(b) threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25). 
(3) Intimidating a witness is a class B felony. 
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.72.110. Amended by 
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 18; Laws 1985, ch. 327, § 2. 
Historical Note 
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 18, whom he has reason to believe may have 
in subsec. (1), inserted "or to a person 
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information relevant to a criminal inves-
tigation". 
Laws 1985, ch. 327, § 2, in subsec. (1), 
inserted "a person directs a threat to a 
former witness because of the witness' 
testimony in any official proceeding, or 
if; and inserted "current" preceding 
"witness". 
Severability—Laws 1982, 1st Ex. 
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note follow-
ing § 9.41.190. 
Source: 
Laws 1901, ch. 17, § 1. 
Laws 1909, ch. 249, § 111. 
RRS § 2363. 
Former § 9.69.080. 
Laws 1969. Ex.Sess., ch. 56, § 1. 
Library References 
Obstructing Justice <s=>4. 
CJ.S. Obstructing Justice or Govern-
mental Administration § 9 et seq. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW guide following the Preface of this volume. 
Notes of Decisions 
Pendency of proceeding 
Validity of prior law 1 
Words used 3 
1. Validity of prior law 
Section 9.69.080 (repealed; see, now, 
this section), which proscribed tamper-
ing with a witness with an intent to 
obstruct the course of justice was not 
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Hegge 
(1978) 89 Wash.2d 584. 574 P.2d 386. 
2. Pendency of proceeding 
Where threat against complaining par-
ty was allegedly made one day after ar-
rest of codefendants and no information 
had yet been filed at that time, and "offi-
cial proceeding" was not pending at the 
time the threat was allegedly made, and 
thus juvenile defendant could not be 
convicted of intimidating a witness. 
State v. Pella (1980) 25 Wash.App. 795. 
612 P.2d 8. 
3. Words used 
Whether a person attempted to pre-
vent the appearance of a witness in vio-
lation of former § 9.69.080 (see. now. 
this section) did not depend solely upon 
the literal meaning of words used to the 
witness, but could be determined on the 
basis of the inferential meaning of such 
words in the context in which they were 
used. State v. Scherck (1973) 9 Wash. 
App. 792, 514 P.2d 1393. 
9A.72.120. Tampering with a witness 
(1) A person is guilty of tampering with a witness if he attempts 
to induce a witness or person he has reason to believe is about to be 
called as a witness in any official proceeding or a person whom he 
has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal 
investigation to: 
(a) Testify falsely or, without right or privilege to do so, to 
withhold any testimony; or 
(b) Absent himself from such proceedings. 
(2) Tampering with a witness is a class C felony. 
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.72.120. Amended by 




l.aws 1982. 1st Ex.Sess.. ch. 47. § 19, Source: 
in subsec. (1). inserted "or a person 
whom he has reason to believe may have 
information relevant to a criminal inves-
tigation". 
Severability—Laws 1982, 1st Ex. 
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note follow-
ing § 9.41.190. 
9A.72.120 
4 
Laws 1901. ch. 17. § 1. 
Laws 1909, ch. 249. § 111. 
RRS § 2363. 
Former § 9.69.080. 
Laws 1969, Ex.Sess.. ch. 56, § 1. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW guide following the Preface of this volume. 
Notes of Decisions 
Intent 3 
Pending proceeding 4 
Validity 1 
Validity of prior law 2 
Witness not under subpoena 
t. Validity 
This section defining offense of tam-
pering with a witness is neither vague 
nor overbroad. State v. Stroh (1979) 91 
Wash.2d 580. 588 P.2d 1182. 
2. Validity of prior law 
Section 9.69.080 (repealed; see, now, 
this section), regarding tampering with a 
witness, was not unconstitutionally over-
broad on its face. State v. Hegge (1978) 
89 Wash.2d 584, 574 P.2d 386. 
Section 9.69.080 (repealed; see, now, 
this section), which proscribed tamper-
ing with a witness with an intent to 
obstruct the course of justice was not 
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Hegge 
(1978) 89 Wash.2d 584, 574 P.2d 386. 
3. Intent 
Fact that this section defining crime of 
tampering with a witness did not ex-
pressly include as one of its elements an 
intent to obstruct justice did not render 
statute unconstitutional, as statute was 
based upon apparent legislative finding 
that attempts to influence a witness to 
change his testimony or to absent him-
self from trial or other official proceed-
ing necessarily have as their purpose, 
and it is their natural tendency, to ob-
struct justice. State v. Stroh (1979) 91 
Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182. 
This section defining crime of tamper-
ing with a witness implicitly requires 
showing that accused knew that person 
approached was a witness or had reason 
to believe that he was about to be called 
as such State v. Stroh (1979) 91 Wash. 
2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182. 
In a prosecution for tampering with a 
witness, intent to obstruct justice need 
not be proved as a separate element, for 
intent to perform acts proscribed by this 
section, with knowledge or reason to be-
lieve that person is or probably is about 
to be called as a witness, conclusively 
shows an intent to obstruct. State v. 
Stroh (1979) 91 Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 
1182. 
Prosecution must prove that false testi-
mony was wilfully procured by accused, 
who knew that it was false and that 
witness would so testify. State v. Bixby 
(1947) 27 Wash.2d 144, 177 P.2d 689. 
4. Pending proceeding 
The existence of a pending judicial 
proceeding was not an element of the 
crime of witness tampering under for-
mer § 9.69.080 (see, now, this section), 
which proscribed the interference with a 
witness' appearance before a court or 
officer in connection with any action, 
proceeding, or investigation. State v. 
Scherck (1973) 9 Wash.App. 792, 514 
P.2d 1393. 
Where indictment charging accused 
with attempting to induce witness in 
criminal case to leave state so that he 
could not be produced in case contains 
complaint in such case in full, which 
fails to show cause was pending, indict-
ment fails to charge accused with crime, 
there being no crime to induce witness 
to leave state except a cause be pending. 
Armstrong v. Van De Vanter (1899) 21 
Wash. 682, 59 P. 510. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38 
In order to convict the Defendant, Ralph Tolmanf of the crime of 
Tampering With a Witnessf as alleged in Count IV of the Indictment, 
you must find from the evidencef beyond a reasonable doubtf all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1- That the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, believed that an official 
proceedinq r.r investigation was pending or about to be instituted; 
2 , That* the Defendant knowingly or intentionally attempted to 
induce or otnerwise cause C Dpan Larsen to withhold Ralph Tolman's 
seven-page investigative report -r August 1, 1983, regarding the May 
1 , 1983 Fashion Place Profession..!; ^ .<:*•* a 'i'-e; and 
3. offense occurred on c about and between August 1, 
1983, and August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each of the fore-
going elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the 
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, guilty of Tamper nvi •* •- * Witness, On the 
other hand, if t fi-p evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
said elements, then it is your duty to fiau the Defendant not guilty. 
A-8 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12-
In order to convict the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, of the 
crime of Tampering With a Witness, as alleged in Count IV of the 
Indictment, you must find from the evidence proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that each of the following elements of the crime 
were committed by him: 
1. That the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, believed that an 
official proceeding or investigation was pending or 
about to be instituted; 
2. That the Defendant knowingly or intentionally 
attempted to induce or otherwise cause C. Dean Larsen 
to engage in some conduct; 
3. That the conduct he attempted to induce or cause 
was the withholding of Ralph Tolmanfs seven-page 
investigative report from the official proceeding or 
investigation; and 
4. That the offense occurred on or about and between 
August 1, 1983, and August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty 
to find the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, guilty of Tampering With a 
Witness. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said elements, then it is your duty to 
find the Defendant not guilty. 
"A-9" 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
No. 8 East Broadway 
Judge Building, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
RODNEY G. SNOW #30 28 
200 American Savings Plaz.a-
77 West 200 South \ -;; 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410.1' 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
V\. Fp l o 1987 
,ty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 




Case No, CR-86-1522 
(Judge Raymond Uno) 
The matter of discovery came before the above-entitled Court 
on January 30, 1987 with Larry R. Keller present and representing 
Plaintiff, and Defendant Harman present and represented by Edward 
K. Brass. Scott Reed, representing Defendant Tolman was also 
present. After hearing arguments of counsel, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. Counsel for Plaintiff shall provide to Defendant Harman's 
and Defendant Tolmanfs attorneys, at Defendants1 expense, one 




before the Salt Lake County Grand Jury on the matter which gave 
rise to the Indictment in the above-entitled case. 
2„ No person receiving a copy of the transcript of testi-
mony before the Grand Jury shall allow any person other than a 
member of the staff of the attorney or the Defendant himself to 
view or read said transcript. Further, it is ordered that no 
other copies of the transcript of Grand Jury testimony shall be 
created without specitic permission of the court. It is further 
ordered that any violation of the above orders shall subject the 
violator to the full contempt powers of this Court. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
'jLlh. w RAYMOND S. UNO 
Tni/rd D i s t r i c t C o u r t Ifrudge 
0001G& 
r^u3A£Dj 
LONI F . DeLAND ( 0 8 6 2 ) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAR 7 1987 
LWuty Cie»k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and RALPH 
TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT TOLMAN'S LIST 
OF WITNESSES 
Case No. CR 86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
1. Defendant anticipates calling no witnesses in 
addition to those relied upon by Plaintiff. However, Defendant 
may call the following persons as part of his case in chief. 
In addition to Plaintiff's witnesses, Defendant Tolman 
may call: 
Mike Christiensen - Salt Lake County Attorney; 
Jim Burns - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; 
Brad Adamson - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; 
Shauna Clark - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; 
Records Librarian - Salt Lake County Personnel; 
Records Librarian - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; 
"A-11" 0 0 o ^ 
so 
Records Librarian - P.O.S.T., State of Utah; 
Don Sawaya - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; 
Ron Boyce - U.S. Magistrate; 
Thomas B. Green - Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups; 
Robert H. Henderson, Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
2. The documents relied upon by Defendant may include 
personnel records, reports, and training history of Defendant 
Tolman. 
DATED this ( **7 day of February, 1987. 
v
 EONI F. D eLAND ^ I 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
JfL SCOTT W. REED ' ~ 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the )j day of February, 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered 
to Larry R. Keller, Judge Building, #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 77 West 200 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
\&X ooo^ 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 81402 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
} Q | FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
iv f { Salt Lake County, Utah 
MAR 3 0 1987 
j i.--^r, • H. Dixon Hindiey. C/ofK 3rc D;$r Co I T ; 
L L j ay £=W _ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, by and through his coun-
sel, Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, herein moves this Court 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 23, §77-35-23 
Utah Code Annotated (amended 1980), for an order granting arrest 
of judgment due to impropriety in the jury deliberation which 
resulted in a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Ralph 
Tolman. This motion is made and the order should be granted for 
good cause and in the interest of justice. 
DATED this ^ ° day of March, 1! 
LONI y. DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
"A-12" 
0 Q Q & « 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of March, 1987, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426, 
8 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Rodney Gc Snow, 
American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
ooa*fc4 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 81402 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 






FILED IN CLERK'S OFFlCt 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
MAR 3 0 1^87 
H. Dixon nmUKsy, o»ou< ^ ^ ~;3( v„-c;iji 
By i ^ = ^ -
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, having previously raised 
the issues orally on the record through his counsel, herein makes 
written motion for an order of the court vacating the judgment 
and declaring a mistrial based upon instances of conduct by the 
prosecution which substantially deprived Ralph Tolman of a full 
and fair trial, as set forth in his memorandum which accompanies 
this motion. 
DATED this 3c? day of March, 1987r 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
"A-13" 
ooo*G8 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the "3>0 day of March, 1987, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426, 
8 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Rodney G. Snow, 
American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
ooo^9 
-2-
LONI F . DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 S o u t h 600 E a s t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84102 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 6 4 - 1 3 3 3 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t Tolman 
TILED IN CLERK'S OFFiC(: 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
AUG 1 9 1987 
H. Dixon Hin^ey^C^^ 'fo u-.t Cc 
3v — ^ — 4 — : " 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARL 
ANDERSON 
Case No, CR86-1522 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Karl Anderson, being first duly sworn upon my oath, 
depose and state: 
1. Affiant, Karl Anderson, was a juror in the 
above-captioned case. 
2. After the second day of jury deliberation in this 
matter, the jury was in agreement that Defendant Tolman's guilt 
had not been established on any charge and the jury was 6-2 in 
favor of acquittal as to Defendant Harman. 
"A-14" 
3. Several jurors wished to break at or about 5:00 
p.m. due mostly to church obligations (L.D.S.). I expressed a 
desire to remain since our verdict (of acquittal) seemed close at 
hand. 
4. One juror, a professed L.D.S. seminary teacher, who 
was the strong force for conviction, suggested we join in a group 
prayer to obtain divine guidance in our deliberations. 
5. I was unhappy about the interjection of religion 
but five other jurors seemed to follow the seminary teachers lead 
on most matters and agreed to participate in the prayer. 
6. I essentially ignored the prayer but I did note 
that immediately following the prayer the seminary teacher 
expressed a certain knowledge gained from the exercise. 
7. I do not recall whether he claimed inspiration, 
revelation or some other such guidance but he almost immediately 
convinced the other five jurors of need to find the Defendants 
guilty and from that point on, those six jurors became totally 
immovable. 
8. It was obvious that from that moment on the jurors 
who prayed would not be swayed in spite of their previous beliefs 
that the evidence was insufficient. 
9. As stated in my prior affidavit, I eventually gave 
in to convictions because the majority wouldn*t consider changing 
and I was not aware we could be a hung jury. There is no ques-
tion that the seminary teacher's call for prayer and subsequent 
-2-
expressions of his knowledge of what was required of the jury was 
the reason for guilty verdicts. 
DATED this / y day of August, 1987. 
'^±^J&<J 
£ARL ANDERSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / >-/ day of 
August, 1987. 
—NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: [Q~ L- —C?D 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KARL E. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn upon my 
oath, depose and state: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
residing at 3421 South 7860 West in Magna, Utah. 
2. Commencing on February 17, 1987 until March 6, 
1987, I served as one of eight jurors in the case of State of 
Utah v. Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman. 
MAY 4 1987 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARL E. 
ANDERSON 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
3. At no time during the trial or jury deliberations 
did I form any opinion or belief that Ralph Tolman was guilty of 
any of the charges. 
4. At no time was I instructed or led to believe that 
I need not return a verdict or could withhold my verdict result-
ing in no decision by the jury. 
5. Had I known or been instructed that withholding my 
vote and maintaining a position of not guilty was allowable and 
would not result in prolonged deliberation, I would not have cast 
a vote of guilty in this case. 
6. Since the time of trial and deliberation, my belief 
in this matter has not changed. 
DATED this */ day of May, 1987. 
KARL E. ANDERSON 





Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: [0 - ^ - *}Q 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J- day of May, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to 
Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; 
Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111; and Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. **- ( ^ e af'C^rfr-eP ZTCZu^
 <siyr~ 
-3- G O ^ 
LARRY R. KELLER (1785) 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South, Box 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
RODNEY G. SNOW (3028) 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt- Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 





Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
Plaintifff 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
RALPH TOLMAN'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
Came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of August, 1987, 
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the Court having read the 
memoranda filed by the parties and having considered the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied; and 
"A-15" 
2. That the Affidavit of Karl E. Anderson be stricken from the 
record. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Raymond Uno 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
ATTEST 
H DiXON HiNDLEY 
r \ I £-x cicrk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 8 y I \ ^ Deputy Clerk 
I hereby certify that I served true and correct copies of the 
foregoing, by placing said copies in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, this 8th day of October, 1987, to the following: 
Edward K. Brass, Esq. Loni F. DeLand, Esq. 
321 South 600 East Scott W. Reed, Esq. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 McRae & DeLand 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
